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A BARE DESIRE TO HARM: TRANSGENDER 
PEOPLE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE 
KEVIN M. BARRY* 
BRIAN FARRELL** 
JENNIFER L. LEVI*** 
NEELIMA VANGURI**** 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges establish-
ing marriage equality for same-sex couples marks a major shift in recognizing 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people as a central part of the fabric of American so-
ciety. Obergefell also marks the passing of the torch from “LGB” to “T”; the 
next civil rights frontier belongs to transgender people, for whom key barriers 
still remain. In January 2015, a transgender woman filed an equal protection 
challenge to a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which 
explicitly excludes several medical conditions closely associated with 
transgender people. In support of this challenge, lawyers for the plaintiff (and 
co-authors of this Article) advance a novel argument: transgender people are a 
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class entitled to heightened scrutiny. The authors 
further argue that the ADA’s transgender exclusions are unconstitutional no mat-
ter what level of scrutiny applies because moral animus against transgender 
people is not a legitimate basis for lawmaking. This equal protection challenge 
paves the way for the extension of disability rights protection to transgender 
people under the Rehabilitation Act, Fair Housing Act, and state anti-disability 
discrimination laws that mirror the ADA. It also marks a new break for equality 
law—reaching far beyond disability rights to all laws that single out transgender 
people for disparate treatment. This challenge also informs the broader theoreti-
cal debate over the relationship between identity and impairment, and diagnosis 
and discrimination.  
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INTRODUCTION 
All I was doing was being me. That’s all I ever wanted.1 
“A prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story of the 
extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or 
excluded.”2 Over the past several decades, this constitutional history has 
expanded to include the story of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, culmi-
nating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
in 2015, which definitively recognized the right to marry someone of the 
same sex.3 But another story, lesser known and of more recent vintage, is 
being written. It is the story of transgender people. 
Since its inception in the early 1990s, the transgender rights movement 
has been largely subsumed by the civil rights movement of gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual (“LGB”) people.4 This makes sense; many transgender people are 
also gay, lesbian, or bisexual, so legal victories in the sexual orientation 
context have necessarily accrued to transgender people.5 Marriage equality 
under Obergefell marks the summit of an incremental march toward equali-
ty under the Constitution—one that gained steam decades earlier with suc-
cessful challenges to facially discriminatory laws that stripped LGB people 
of civil rights protections (Romer v. Evans, decided by the Court in 1996) 
and criminalized same-sex intimacy (Lawrence v. Texas, decided by the 
Court in 2003). By removing the last key barrier to equality under the Con-
stitution for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, Obergefell also marks the 
passing of the torch from “LGB” to “T.” The next civil rights frontier be-
longs to transgender people. 
Like the LGB rights movement, the transgender rights movement has 
proceeded incrementally, successfully challenging cross-dressing laws, un-
fair workplace practices, public and private health insurance exclusions, and 
antiquated surgical requirements for obtaining changes to birth certificates 
and other official documents. In contrast to the legal challenges that have 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Blatt Dep. 189:17-21, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL (E.D. Pa. argued 
Dec. 9, 2015). 
 2 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996); see also RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE 
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781–1789, at 193 (1987) (discussing the history of the Constitution). 
 3 See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).  
 4 Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights?, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 
141, 142 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the question of whether the gay rights 
movement should include transgender people). 
 5 See id. (stating that a “sizeable percentage of transgender people also identify as lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual”). For example, Obergefell benefitted transgender people, although not explicitly, 
in same-sex relationships (e.g., a male-to-female transgender person married to a non-transgender 
woman). See 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (recognizing the right to marry someone of the same sex). 
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characterized the LGB rights movement, however, no transgender litigant 
has ever challenged—let alone succeeded in striking down—a facially dis-
criminatory federal law under the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, no 
court or agency has ever addressed the critical question of whether statutory 
transgender classifications should be subject to “heightened scrutiny”—the 
most rigorous standard of review applied by courts under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. More specifically, in the context of a facially discriminatory 
federal law, no court or agency has analyzed whether transgender people are 
a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, which would require that they have 
suffered a history of discrimination, have the ability to contribute to society, 
exhibit immutable distinguishing characteristics, and are a politically pow-
erless minority. Nor has any court or agency determined whether statutory 
transgender classifications are sex-based and therefore subject to the same 
level of scrutiny as statutory gender classifications. And no court or agency 
has considered whether moral animus against transgender people is a legit-
imate basis for lawmaking. Simply put, the transgender rights movement is 
still without its Obergefell.6 As a result, the constitutional rights of 
transgender people remain uncertain. 
But this is changing. The next chapter in the story of constitutional 
rights for transgender people is underway, and it comes from an unlikely 
place: a facial equal protection challenge to the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”).7 
Tucked away in the last title of the ADA, entitled “Miscellaneous Pro-
visions,” is a set of exclusions from the ADA’s definition of disability.8 
Specifically, the ADA excludes from its definition of disability “homosexu-
ality and bisexuality” because they “are not impairments and as such are not 
disabilities.”9 Both medicine and law support this exclusion. Indeed, it is 
consistent with the American Psychiatric Association’s removal of the diag-
nosis of homosexuality from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (recognizing the right to marry someone of the same 
sex); see also United States v. Windsor (Windsor II), 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (invalidating 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which excluded same-sex marriages from 
the definition of “marriage” under federal law); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) 
(invalidating a state law that criminalized same-sex intimacy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
629–30, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment that prohibited all existing 
and future antidiscrimination laws protecting lesbian, gay, and bisexual people).  
 7 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 16, Blatt, No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2015 WL 1360179 [here-
inafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition] (arguing that the ADA’s exclusion of 
transgender people violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 8 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012). 
 9 Id. 
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tal Disorders (“DSM”) in 1973.10 It is also consistent with courts’ recogni-
tion that homosexuality and bisexuality were not “impairments” under the 
ADA’s precursor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11 
The ADA also excludes from coverage “transvestism,” “gender identi-
ty disorders not resulting from physical impairments,” and “transsexual-
ism,” but it does so for a very different reason.12 Unlike homosexuality and 
bisexuality, the ADA does not exclude these conditions under the theory 
that they are not medical “impairments.”13 Instead, the ADA excludes trans-
vestism, transsexualism, and gender identity disorder (“GID”) because of 
the moral opprobrium of two senior U.S. senators, conveyed in the eleventh 
hour of a marathon day-long floor debate, who believed that all were “sexu-
al behavior disorders” undeserving of legal protection.14 
In 2014, a transgender woman named Kate Lynn Blatt sued her em-
ployer, Cabela’s Retail, Inc., for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA.15 The facts of Ms. Blatt’s case are, unfor-
tunately, all too typical of the discrimination experienced by transgender 
people. Diagnosed with GID in October 2005,16 Ms. Blatt grew long hair, 
                                                                                                                           
 10 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
TRANSGENDER AND GENDER VARIANT INDIVIDUALS 2 (2012) [hereinafter APA POSITION STATE-
MENT ON DISCRIMINATION], http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Documents/2013_04_AC_06d_
APA_ps2012_Transgen_Disc.pdf [perma.cc/94NS-H4GQ] (discussing APA’s support of gay and 
lesbian civil rights as background for support of transgender rights). 
 11 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 88 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), available at 1990 WL 121679 (“The 
Senate bill restates current policy under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that the term 
‘disability’ does not include homosexuality and bisexuality.”). 
 12 42 U.S.C. § 12211. As discussed below, the DSM considered transsexualism to be a sub-
type of GID until 1994, when it removed the diagnosis of transsexualism altogether. See infra note 
13 and accompanying text (discussing revision to DSM). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 12211. Indeed, the DSM considered each of these conditions to be medical 
impairments long before and well after passage of the ADA. See Christine Michelle Duffy, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY 
AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-153 
to 16-158 (Christine Michelle Duffy ed., 2014) (containing graphic depiction of organization of 
GID, transsexualism, and transvestism in various editions of DSM). Although the fifth edition of 
the DSM, published in 2013, eliminated “Gender Identity Disorder” (“GID”) and added “Gender 
Dysphoria,” the DSM did not remove the diagnoses associated with transgender people. AM. PSY-
CHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
 14 See infra notes 118–187 and accompanying text (discussing Senate floor debate that ulti-
mately resulted in the exclusion of the transgender-related conditions from the ADA). 
 15 Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 1–2, Blatt, No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2014 WL 4379556 [here-
inafter Complaint]. 
 16 See Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders et al. in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 11 n.4, Blatt, No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2015 WL 1322781 
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (stating that Plaintiff Blatt alleges that “her 2005 GID diagno-
sis also meets the 2013 Gender Dysphoria diagnostic criteria”); Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 11. 
2016] Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause 511 
dressed in feminine attire, underwent hormone therapy, and changed her 
name from “James” to “Kate Lynn” as part of her medical transition.17 In 
September 2006, Cabela’s, a sporting goods store, hired Ms. Blatt to work 
as a merchandise stocker. She attended a two-day orientation dressed in fe-
male attire and used the women’s employee restroom without issue.  
Once she began working, however, the discrimination began. Cabela’s 
refused to give Ms. Blatt a female uniform and required her to wear a name-
tag bearing the name “James” and to use the male bathroom until she pro-
vided documentation that her name and gender marker had been legally 
changed. When Ms. Blatt provided such documentation, she received three 
incorrect nametags before receiving one that read “Kate Lynn,” and 
Cabela’s again refused to allow her to use the female employee restroom. 
Her employer reasoned that because she did not take any time off work, she 
could not have undergone sex reassignment surgery and, therefore, might 
rape or assault someone using the female restroom. After suggesting that 
Ms. Blatt use the restroom at a Dunkin’ Donuts across the street, Cabela’s 
eventually allowed her to use the single-sex “family” restroom at the front 
of the store and far removed from her work station.  
In addition, Cabela’s required Ms. Blatt to work alone in a secluded 
part of the store away from customers, while other merchandise stockers 
worked in teams throughout the store.18 Cabela’s failed to discipline em-
ployees who referred to Ms. Blatt as “ladyboy,” “he/she,” “fag,” “sinner,” 
“freak,” “cross-dressing gay fruit,” and “confused sicko.” Finally, Cabela’s 
refused to consider her for a promotion, and abruptly terminated her in 
March 2007.19 
Invoking the ADA’s exclusion of GID and transsexualism, Cabela’s 
filed a motion to dismiss the ADA claim.20 In January 2015, nearly twenty-
five years after the ADA’s passage, Ms. Blatt filed the first-ever equal pro-
tection challenge to the ADA’s exclusion of GID and transsexualism.21 In 
her brief, Ms. Blatt argues that the exclusions target people with these med-
                                                                                                                           
 17 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 7, at 3–7. Except as otherwise 
noted, all facts in the case of Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. are drawn from Part II of the Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s 
First Amended Complaint. 
 18 Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 23. 
 19 Id. ¶¶ 25–26. 
 20 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 7, at 7–8 (discussing proce-
dural history of the case). 
 21 Id. at 8–44 (discussing the Plaintiff’s argument). Because Ms. Blatt was diagnosed with 
GID, not “transvestism,” she challenges only the constitutionality of the ADA’s exclusion of GID 
and transsexualism—not its exclusion of “transvestites” and “transvestism.” Nevertheless, her 
arguments against the exclusion of GID and transsexualism apply with equal force to the exclu-
sion of transvestism. 
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ical conditions, namely, transgender people, and that this transgender classi-
fication should be subjected to strict scrutiny.22 At a minimum, she argues, 
the classification should be subjected to mid-level review because being 
transgender—that is, having an inconsistency between a person’s gender 
identity and assigned sex at birth—relates to a person’s sex.23 Ms. Blatt fur-
ther argues that the transgender classification fails even the most minimal 
level of scrutiny because the ADA’s legislative history, coupled with the 
structure and practical effect of its exclusions, reveal that the classification 
was founded upon nothing more than moral animus—an evidentiary trump 
card that discredits other “legitimate” explanations as mere pretext.24 
As the first facial equal protection challenge to a federal statute ex-
cluding transgender people,25 Ms. Blatt’s case represents an important de-
velopment for disability law, as well as a new break for transgender equality 
and equality law more generally. If Ms. Blatt’s argument prevails (either in 
her own case or in those that will undoubtedly follow), her challenge will 
establish firm precedent for the extension of disability rights protection to 
transgender people not only under the ADA, but also under the Rehabilita-
tion Act and, possibly, the Fair Housing Act and a host of state antidiscrimi-
nation laws that exclude transgender people.26 A successful equal protection 
challenge will also reach far beyond disability rights to any laws that single 
out transgender people for disparate treatment.27 This includes current De-
partment of Defense policies that prohibit military service on the basis of 
“transsexualism” and “transvestism,”28 and inappropriate denials of medical 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 18–26. 
 23 Id. at 26–28. 
 24 Id. at 34–39; see Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
887, 892 (2012) (arguing that evidence of animus is a “doctrinal silver bullet” that “poisons the 
well, discrediting other explanations as mere pretext for unconstitutional discrimination”). 
 25 Transgender public employees have brought equal protection challenges to workplace prac-
tices under the Equal Protection Clause, and transgender inmates have brought equal protection 
challenges to the conditions of their confinement and inadequate healthcare. See infra notes 412–
420 and accompanying text (discussing same). None of these cases, however, involved equal pro-
tection challenges to a statute; all challenged various practices or conditions. In addition, 
transgender litigants have brought challenges to state health care and birth certificate laws under 
the Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 114, 471 and accompanying text (discussing same). 
 26 See infra notes 465–466 and accompanying text (discussing the potential impact of Ms. 
Blatt’s equal protection challenge on the federal Rehabilitation and Fair Housing Acts and state 
antidiscrimination laws). 
 27 See infra notes 469–471 and accompanying text (discussing laws that single out 
transgender people for disparate treatment). 
 28 The repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” did not apply to transgender people. See infra notes 
382–383 and accompanying text. 
2016] Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause 513 
coverage for transgender healthcare.29 A successful ADA challenge would 
therefore be a crucial first step toward securing for transgender people what 
Obergefell and its predecessors secured for gay, lesbian, and bisexual peo-
ple: constitutional recognition of their equality, an affirmation of equality 
law’s expansive embrace, and a firm rejection of moral animus as a justifi-
cation for exclusion.30 
Ms. Blatt’s equal protection challenge also informs the broader theo-
retical debate over the relationship between transgender identity and medi-
cal impairment, as well as Gender Dysphoria’s place under disability rights 
law. By claiming disability rights employment protection based on Gender 
Dysphoria, Ms. Blatt does not argue that all transgender people have a med-
ical condition. On the contrary, she argues that many transgender people 
have no impairment; they are completely comfortable living just the way 
they are.31 For some transgender people, however, the incongruence be-
tween gender identity and assigned sex at birth results in Gender Dyspho-
ria—a serious, but treatable, medical condition that should be protected by 
disability rights law.32 Ms. Blatt’s argument also underscores the importance 
of the “social model” of disability, which holds that it is society’s negative 
reactions to our medical conditions—not the conditions themselves—that 
cause disability.33 Consistent with the social model, she argues that her em-
ployer’s negative reactions to Gender Dysphoria—namely fear, discomfort, 
lack of understanding, and animus—resulted in her termination from a job 
that she performed well.34 As a result, she deserves protection under disabil-
ity rights law. 
To paraphrase Justice Kennedy, Ms. Blatt’s case, and many like it to 
come, thrust courts into “uncharted waters.”35 But, there is no “cliff” on the 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra note 471 and accompanying text (discussing laws that single out transgender 
people for disparate treatment). 
 30 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Obergefell, Windsor II, Lawrence, and 
Romer decisions). 
 31 See infra notes 474–478 and accompanying text (discussing Ms. Blatt’s argument). 
 32 See infra notes 474–478 and accompanying text (discussing Ms. Blatt’s argument). 
 33 See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text (discussing the “social model” of disabil-
ity). 
 34 See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text (discussing the “social model” of disabil-
ity). By claiming protection under the ADA, Ms. Blatt does not argue that Gender Dysphoria in-
herently prevents her from working. See infra note 481 and accompanying text (discussing the 
potential impact of Ms. Blatt’s equal protection challenge on theoretical debates surrounding 
transgender rights). Indeed, were that the case, she would not have protections under the ADA. 
See infra note 481 and accompanying text (same). 
 35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144_5if6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/77JU-57K9] [hereinafter Hollingsworth Oral Argument] (discussing California’s Propo-
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horizon, just a destination as “wonderful” as it is inevitable: equal protec-
tion for transgender people under the ADA and beyond.36 Part I of this Arti-
cle discusses transgender identity and the medical diagnosis of Gender 
Dysphoria, with particular emphasis on the evolution of the diagnosis from 
“disorder” to “dysphoria” and its wide acceptance as a serious medical con-
dition by the medical community and the courts.37 Part II turns to the ADA’s 
exclusion of transvestism, transsexualism, and GID based on several senior 
senators’ moral animus toward transgender people.38 Part III reviews the 
Supreme Court’s three-tiered equal protection analysis, focusing on the line 
of cases that have invalidated classifications based on “a bare desire to 
harm” politically unpopular groups.39 This Part analyzes the novel argu-
ments supporting recognition of transgender people as a new suspect class 
demanding strict scrutiny and, in the alternative, a quasi-suspect class de-
manding intermediate scrutiny. It further argues that the ADA’s transgender 
exclusions fail no matter what level of scrutiny is applied because there is 
simply no government justification other than moral animus for excluding 
transgender people from the law’s protections. Part IV discusses the broader 
implications of Ms. Blatt’s equal protection challenge for law and theory,40 
and the Conclusion offers some closing remarks.41 
I. TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND GENDER DYSPHORIA 
A transgender person is someone whose gender identity—that is, an 
individual’s internal sense of being male or female—does not align with his 
or her assigned sex at birth.42 Usually, people born with the physical charac-
teristics of males psychologically identify as men, and those with the physi-
cal characteristics of females psychologically identify as women. For a 
                                                                                                                           
sition 8, a ballot initiative that amended the state’s Constitution to validate only marriages be-
tween a man and a woman). 
 36 See Hollingsworth Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 48 (discussing California’s Proposi-
tion 8); cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (holding that same-sex couples may not be deprived 
the right to marry under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 37 See infra notes 42–117 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 118–202 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 203–461 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 462–481 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 482–484 and accompanying text. 
 42 See, e.g., DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457 (discussing Gender Dysphoria); Guidance Regard-
ing the Employment of Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace, U.S. OFF. OF PERSON-
NEL MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversity-and-inclusion/reference-materials/
gender-identity-guidance/ [perma.cc/8NJB-ZV8Z] [hereinafter OPM Guidance] (discussing core 
concepts relating to transgender people and answering common questions regarding employment 
of transgender people). 
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transgender person, however, this is not true; the person’s body and the per-
son’s gender identity do not match. 
Although transgender issues have exploded into the public conscious-
ness in recent years,43 transgender people have been a part of every society 
and culture throughout time:44 from ancient males who altered their bodies 
and Native American Two-Spirit people, to the “mollies” of eighteenth-
century London and the drag queens and transsexuals who helped spark a 
civil rights movement by resisting a police raid on the Stone Wall Inn in 
New York’s Greenwich Village in 1969.45 A growing body of medical re-
search suggests that the incongruence between a person’s gender identity 
and assigned sex at birth is caused by “genetics and/or in utero exposure to 
the ‘wrong’ hormones during the development of the brain, such that the 
anatomic physical body and the brain develop in different gender paths.”46 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See generally CHAZ BONO, TRANSITION: THE STORY OF HOW I BECAME A MAN (2011) 
(autobiography of Chaz Bono, son of famous singers Sonny and Cher); Buzz Bissinger, Caitlyn 
Jenner: The Full Story, VANITY FAIR (June 30, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/
2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-bruce-cover-annie-leibovitz [https://perma.cc/TK3Y-G5KC] (featuring 
widely-publicized story of the transition of Caitlyn Jenner, a transgender woman formerly known 
as Olympian Bruce Jenner); Emily Nussbaum, Inside Out, NEW YORKER (Jan. 4, 2016), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/04/inside-out-on-television-emily-nussbaum [perma.cc/
FX64-SLFG] (discussing the “masterpiece” television show “Transparent” that premiered its sec-
ond season in 2015 about a grandfather who transitions); Opinion, Transgender Lives: Your Sto-
ries, N.Y. TIMES: TRANSGENDER TODAY, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/storywall/
transgender-today [perma.cc/2F58-DKWQ] (opinion page featuring “personal stories that reflect 
the strength, diversity and challenges of the community”); Alia Wong, The K–12 Binary, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/the-k-12-binary/
398060/ [perma.cc/6MXL-34UY] (discussing the struggle over transgender rights in schools). 
 44 See Richard Green, Transsexualism: Mythological, Historical, and Cross-Cultural Aspects, 
in HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON app. C at 97 (1966), http://www.mut23.
de/texte/Harry%20Benjamin%20%20The%20Transsexual%20Phenomenon.pdf [perma.cc/3N6A-
RVVW] (“Evidence for the phenomenon today called transsexualism can be found in records 
backward through centuries and spanning widely separated cultures.”); see also Dallas Denny, 
Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late Twentieth Century, in TRANSGENDER 
RIGHTS 171, 171 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (“From prehistoric times to the present, indi-
viduals whom today we might call transgender[] and transsexual have played prominent roles in 
many societies, including our own.”). 
 45 See Denny, supra note 44, at 175 (discussing Christine Jorgensen and the history of sex 
reassignment surgery); Minter, supra note 4, at 142 (discussing transgender involvement in the 
gay liberation movement). 
 46 Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-77 (discussing recent medical studies); see also Doe v. Yunits, 
15 Mass. L. Rptr. 278, 282 n.6 (Super. Ct. 2001) (“In light of the remarkable growth in our under-
standing of the role of genetics in producing what were previously thought to be psychological 
disorders . . . all or some gender identity disorders [may] result ‘from physical impairments’ in an 
individual’s genome.”); DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457 (discussing genetic and, possibly, hormonal 
contribution to Gender Dysphoria); see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 20 (defining “mental disor-
ders” to include dysfunctions of “biological” and “developmental”—as well as “psychological”—
processes underlying mental functioning). 
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Rather than two paths through the wood of embryonic development—one 
yielding normative “men” and another yielding normative “women”—there 
are multiple paths. “[N]ot all embryos will make the ‘right’ combination of 
turns that are needed to yield the normative man or woman . . . . A good 
number will take unexpected detours along the way.”47 
For many transgender people, the incongruence between gender identi-
ty and assigned sex does not interfere with their lives; they are completely 
comfortable living just the way they are.48 For a subset of transgender peo-
ple, however, the incongruence results in gender dysphoria—i.e., a feeling 
of stress and discomfort with one’s assigned sex.49 The national and interna-
tional medical community widely regards such gender dysphoria, if clinical-
ly significant and persistent, as a serious medical condition in need of 
treatment.50 Many courts, legislatures, and agencies have accepted the con-
sensus of the medical community and extended legal protections to people 
with gender dysphoria.51 
Section A of this Part discusses the medical community’s recognition 
of gender dysphoria, including the evolution in terminology from “disorder” 
to “dysphoria,” and medical treatment of the condition.52 Section B then 
examines the recognition of gender dysphoria by the courts.53 
A. Gender Dysphoria and the Medical Community 
Psychiatric and medical theorizing about gender dysphoria began in 
the Western world in the nineteenth century, and physicians in Europe be-
gan performing gender reassignment surgery as early as the 1920s.54 But the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-58. 
 48 See id. at 16-10 (discussing transgender people who do not suffer from gender dysphoria); 
see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 453 (stating that, in addition to a marked incongruence between 
gender identity and assigned sex, individuals with Gender Dysphoria exhibit “distress about this 
incongruence”). 
 49 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451. Consistent with the DSM-5, this Article uses “gender dys-
phoria” (lowercase) as a general descriptive term to refer “to an individual’s affective/cognitive 
discontent with the assigned gender,” and “Gender Dysphoria” (uppercase) to refer “more specifi-
cally . . . [to] a diagnostic category.” Id. at 451–52. 
 50 See id. at 452–53 (providing diagnostic criteria of Gender Dysphoria); WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, at F64 (10th revision 2015), 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2015/en#/F60-F69 [perma.cc/S2ZU-LFVC] 
[hereinafter ICD-10] (discussing gender identity disorders). 
 51 See infra notes 92–117 and accompanying text (discussing gender dysphoria and the law). 
 52 See infra notes 54–91 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 92–117 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Jack Drescher et al., Minding the Body: Situating Gender Identity Diagnoses in the 
ICD-11, 24 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 568, 568–69 (2012) (providing history of gender identity 
diagnostic classification). 
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concept of gender dysphoria as a serious, treatable medical condition re-
ceived little recognition until 1952, when the American media sensationally 
reported the story of ex-G.I. George Jorgensen, who underwent gender reas-
signment surgery in Denmark and returned to the United States as Christine 
Jorgensen.55 At this time, Dr. Harry Benjamin, a New York endocrinologist, 
began treating people struggling with gender identity issues by providing 
them with hormonal therapy and referrals for surgery.56 In 1966, in his in-
fluential treatise, “The Transsexual Phenomenon,” Dr. Benjamin defined 
“transsexualism” as a “syndrome” that results in one being “deeply unhappy 
as a member of the sex (or gender) to which he or she was assigned by the 
anatomical structure of the body, particularly the genitals.”57 In 1969, a 
medical protocol for gender reassignment was developed and in the ensuing 
decade over forty university-affiliated gender programs sprang up across the 
United States, providing treatment to individuals with gender identity is-
sues.58 
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) introduced the 
GID diagnosis in the third edition of the DSM (“DSM-III”). The DSM-III 
defined GID as “an incongruence between anatomic sex and gender identi-
ty,” and created three GID subtypes: one for adolescents and adults (“Trans-
sexualism”), another for children (“GID of Childhood”), and a third for 
conditions that did not fit the diagnostic criteria of the first two: “Atypical 
GID.”59 In 1987, a revised version of the DSM (“DSM-III-R”)—the version 
in effect at the time the ADA was being debated—retained these three diag-
noses60 and added a fourth: “GID of adolescence or adulthood, nontrans-
sexual type.”61 In the next two versions, the DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-
TR (2000), the transsexualism and childhood subtypes were combined into 
the single overarching diagnosis of “GID in children, adolescents, and 
adults.”62 
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the fifth edi-
tion of the DSM (“DSM-5”), which removed the GID diagnosis entirely and 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 569 (discussing Christine Jorgensen); Denny, supra note 44, at 175 (same). 
 56 Denny, supra note 44, at 175. 
 57 BENJAMIN, supra note 44, at 11–12. 
 58 Denny, supra note 44, at 175–76. 
 59 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 261–66 (3d ed. 1980). 
 60 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 71–78 (3d ed. revised 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. The DSM-III-R renamed “Atypical 
GID” “GID Not Otherwise Specified.” Id. at 77–78. 
 61 Id. at 76–77. 
 62 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. With its removal in 1994, transsexualism is no 
longer considered to be a diagnosable condition under the DSM. 
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added a new diagnosis, “Gender Dysphoria.”63 According to the DSM-5, 
Gender Dysphoria is characterized by: (1) “a marked incongruence” be-
tween one’s gender identity and one’s assigned sex, which is often accom-
panied by “a strong desire to be rid of” one’s primary and secondary sex 
characteristics and/or to acquire primary/secondary “sex characteristics of 
the other gender”; and (2) intense emotional pain and suffering resulting 
from this incongruence.64 Among adolescents and adults, Gender Dysphoria 
often begins in early childhood, around the ages of two to three years (“Ear-
ly-onset gender dysphoria”), but it may also occur around puberty or even 
later in life (“Late-onset gender dysphoria”).65 
The international medical community’s recognition of gender dyspho-
ria as a serious medical condition has traced a similar path. The Internation-
al Classification of Diseases (“ICD”), published by the World Health Or-
ganization pursuant to a consensus of 194 member states, has classified 
GID as a mental health condition since 1975.66 The eleventh revision of the 
ICD, expected in 2017, will rename “transsexualism”—the ICD’s GID di-
agnosis for adolescents and adults—“Gender Incongruence,” characterized 
by “a marked and persistent incongruence between an individual’s experi-
enced gender and the assigned sex.”67 
1. From “Disorder” to “Dysphoria” 
The DSM-5’s deletion of GID and its addition of Gender Dysphoria re-
flects a major shift in the medical community’s understanding of gender 
identity and impairment. Given the newness and significance of these 
changes, as well as the dearth of discussion in the legal literature, a brief 
summary of these changes is instructive. 
Gender Dysphoria differs from GID in four significant ways. First, and 
most obviously, unlike GID, Gender Dysphoria is not a “disorder.” For well 
                                                                                                                           
 63 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 452. 
 64 See id. at 452–53 (“The condition is associated with clinically significant distress or im-
pairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”); id. at 453 (stating that, 
in addition to marked incongruence, “[t]here must also be evidence of distress about this incon-
gruence”). 
 65 Id. at 455–56. 
 66 Drescher et al., supra note 54, at 570. The ICD-9, published in 1975, classified “transsexu-
alism” as a medical condition. Id. The most current edition of the ICD, the ICD-10, published in 
1990, includes the classification “Gender Identity Disorders,” and uses “transsexualism” to refer 
specifically to the GID diagnosis for adults and adolescents. ICD-10, supra note 50, at F64. 
 67 WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, ICD-11 CONSENSUS MEETING 5 
(2013), http://www.wpath.org/uploaded_files/140/files/ICD%20Meeting%20Packet-Report-Final-
sm.pdf [perma.cc/H8HL-9MGW] (reviewing the recommendations of an expert working group of 
the World Health Organization regarding development of ICD-11). 
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over thirty years, incongruence between one’s identity and assigned sex was 
considered a “disorder” of identity, that is, something non-normative with 
the individual.68 This is no longer the case. Under the DSM-5, dysphoria, 
rather than incongruence, is the problem in need of treatment.69 The change 
from GID to Gender Dysphoria destigmatizes the diagnosis by shifting the 
focus of the clinical problem from identity to dysphoria.70 Simply put, hav-
ing a gender identity different from one’s assigned sex is no longer a “dis-
order”; it is perfectly healthy.71 What is not healthy, according to the DSM-
5, and what therefore requires treatment, is the dysphoria that some 
transgender people experience.72 
Second, the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria are different than 
the GID criteria. Whereas the GID diagnosis required a “strong and persis-
tent cross-gender identification” and a “persistent discomfort” with one’s 
sex or “sense of inappropriateness” in the gender role of that sex, the crite-
ria for Gender Dysphoria are more straightforward, requiring a “marked 
incongruence” between gender identity and assigned sex.73 Significantly, 
the criteria also include a “post-transition specifier for people who are liv-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 2 (2013), http://www.dsm5.org/
documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf [perma.cc/43HV-RSWA] [hereinafter GEN-
DER DYSPHORIA] (noting that the change in name eliminates GID’s connotation “that the patient is 
‘disordered’”). 
 69 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 458 (“Gender dysphoria should be distinguished from simple 
nonconformity to stereotypical gender role behavior . . . .”); GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 68, 
at 1 (“It is important to note that gender nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder. The criti-
cal element of gender dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress associated with 
the condition.”); WORLD PROF. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE 169 
(7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter SOC] (“Thus, transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming 
individuals are not inherently disordered. Rather, the distress of gender dysphoria, when present, 
is the concern that might be diagnosable and for which various treatment options are available.”). 
 70 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451; GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 68, at 2 (“Part of removing 
stigma is about choosing the right words. Replacing ‘disorder’ with ‘dysphoria’ in the diagnostic 
label is not only more appropriate and consistent with familiar clinical sexology terminology, it 
also removes the connotation that the patient is ‘disordered.’”); see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 
F.3d 733, 737 n. 2 (1st Cir.) (“DSM-5 replaces the term gender identity disorder with gender dys-
phoria to avoid any negative stigma.”), withdrawn, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015). 
 71 See Denny, supra note 44, at 180, 182 (noting that it is healthy to “vary from often un-
healthy gender stereotypes and norms,” to “transition gender roles without a goal of genital sur-
gery,” “to take hormones for a while and then stop,” “to be a woman with breasts and a penis or a 
man with a vagina, to blend genders as if from a palette”). 
 72 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457–58 (discussing consequences of untreated Gender Dyspho-
ria). 
 73 Compare DSM-IV, supra note 62, at 532–38 (discussing GID diagnostic criteria), with 
DSM-5, supra note 13, at 452 (discussing Gender Dysphoria diagnostic criteria), and DSM-5, 
supra note 13, at 814 (stating that DSM-5 “emphasiz[es] the phenomenon of ‘gender incongru-
ence’ rather than cross-gender identification per se, as was the case in DSM-IV gender identity 
disorder”). 
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ing full-time as the desired gender.”74 According to the DSM-5, this specifi-
er was “modeled on the concept of full or partial remission,” which 
acknowledges that hormone therapy and gender reassignment surgery may 
largely relieve the distress associated with the diagnosis, much as chemo-
therapy and radiation restore normal cell growth in people with cancer, and 
as anti-depressants restore healthy brain functioning in people with depres-
sion.75 Significantly, this specifier expands the diagnosis to those who may 
not formerly have been diagnosed with GID—i.e., those without distress 
“who continue to undergo hormone therapy, related surgery, or psychother-
apy or counseling to support their gender transition.”76 
Third, the DSM-5 classifies Gender Dysphoria differently than previ-
ous versions classified GID. In every version of the DSM prior to 2013, 
GID was a subclass of some broader classification, such as “Disorders Usu-
ally First Evident in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence,” alongside other 
subclasses, such as Developmental Disorders, Eating Disorders, and Tic 
Disorders.77 For the first time ever, the DSM categorizes the diagnosis sepa-
rately from all other conditions.78 Under the DSM-5, Gender Dysphoria is 
now literally in a class all its own.79 
Lastly, the Gender Dysphoria diagnosis is strongly supported by recent 
advancements in the medical knowledge and treatment of gender identity 
issues. Unlike the earlier DSM’s treatment of GID and transsexualism, the 
DSM-5 includes a section entitled “Genetics and Physiology,” which ex-
plicitly discusses the genetic and, possibly, hormonal contributions to Gen-
der Dysphoria.80 These findings, together with numerous recent medical 
studies,81 strongly suggest that physical impairments contribute to gender 
incongruence and, in turn, Gender Dysphoria. In sum, Gender Dysphoria 
                                                                                                                           
 74 GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 68, at 1; see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 453 (discuss-
ing Gender Dysphoria diagnostic criteria). 
 75 See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (“[M]any are distressed if the desired physical interven-
tions by means of hormone and/or surgery are not available.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 
453, 814–15 (discussing addition of post-transition specifier). 
 76 GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 68, at 1. 
 77 See DSM-III-R, supra note 60, at 3–4 (discussing categorization of GID). 
 78 See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (placing Gender Dysphoria in separate, stand-alone cate-
gory). 
 79 Id.; see also Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-153 to 16-158 (providing graphic depiction of the 
organization of GIDs and Gender Dysphoria in the various editions of the DSM). 
 80 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 457; see also Second Statement of Interest of the United States at 
3–5, Blatt, No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2015 WL 9872493 (“[T]he burgeoning medical research under-
lying [gender dysphoria] points to a physical etiology.”); SOC, supra note 69, at 169 (discussing 
recent advancements in knowledge and treatment of gender dysphoria). 
 81 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-72 to 16-74 & n.282 (citing numerous medical studies 
conducted in past six years that “point in the direction of hormonal and genetic causes for the in 
utero development of gender dysphoria”). 
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has physical roots that the GID and transsexualism diagnoses do not ex-
pressly share. 
2. A Treatable Medical Condition 
If left medically untreated, Gender Dysphoria can result in depression, 
anxiety and, for some people, suicidality and death.82 Fortunately, medical 
treatment is available.83 There is no single course of medical treatment that 
is appropriate for every person with Gender Dysphoria. Instead, the World 
Professional Association For Transgender Health, Inc. (“WPATH”) has es-
tablished internationally accepted Standards of Care (“SOC”) for the treat-
ment of people with Gender Dysphoria.84 The SOC were originally ap-
proved in 1979 and have undergone seven revisions through 2012, reflect-
ing the rapidly expanding body of medical research relating to gender iden-
tity.85 
As part of the SOC, many transgender individuals with Gender Dys-
phoria undergo a medically recommended and supervised gender transition 
in order to live life consistent with their gender identity.86 The current SOC 
recommend an individualized approach to gender transition, consisting of a 
medically-appropriate combination of hormone therapy, living part- or full-
time in one’s desired gender role,87 gender reassignment surgery, and/or 
psychotherapy.88 Moreover, completion of the medical transition varies 
among transgender individuals. For example, some may only need to live 
part-time or full-time in their desired gender role to complete their transi-
tion, without undergoing hormone therapy or surgery.89 Others may decide 
                                                                                                                           
 82 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 454–55. 
 83 See SOC, supra note 69, at 5 (“Gender dysphoria can in large part be alleviated through 
treatment.”); see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 451 (discussing physical interventions for treating 
Gender Dysphoria). 
 84 SOC, supra note 69, at 1. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(“WPATH”) was formerly known as The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Asso-
ciation. Mission and Values, WORLD PROF. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, http://www.
wpath.org/site_page.cfm?pk_association_webpage_menu=1347&pk_association_webpage=3910 
[perma.cc/2XR9-PXVS]. 
 85 SOC, supra note 69, at 169, 229. 
 86 Id. at 9–10; see also OPM Guidance, supra note 42 (discussing gender transition). 
 87 Living consistent with one’s desired gender role consists of “present[ing] consistently, on a 
day-to-day basis and across all settings of life, in [one’s] desired gender role,” which “provides 
ample opportunity for patients to experience and socially adjust in their desired gender role, before 
undergoing irreversible surgery.” SOC, supra note 69, at 61. 
 88 Id. at 9. 
 89 Id. at 5, 8 (“[W]hile many individuals need both hormone therapy and surgery to alleviate 
their gender dysphoria, others need only one of these treatment options and some need neither.”); 
see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 454 (discussing those who resolve incongruence between gen-
der identity and assigned sex “without seeking medical treatment to alter body characteristics”). 
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with their health care provider that it is medically necessary for them to un-
dergo hormone therapy and/or gender reassignment surgery as well.90 
In addition to WPATH, the American Medical Association (“AMA”), 
the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological As-
sociation, among others, have each acknowledged the necessity of medical 
interventions to assist transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria.91 
B. Gender Dysphoria and the Law 
Following the consensus of the medical community, federal and state 
courts have consistently recognized GID and, more recently, Gender Dys-
phoria, as serious medical conditions deserving of protection under disabil-
ity antidiscrimination law, as well as other laws. Prior to the ADA’s passage 
in 1990, federal disability antidiscrimination law recognized GID as an im-
pairment that may constitute a disability under the ADA’s precursor, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.92 For example, in 1985, in Doe v. U.S. Postal 
Service, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor 
                                                                                                                           
 90 SOC, supra note 69, at 10; see also DSM-5, supra note 13, at 453 (recognizing “cross-sex 
medical procedure[s] or treatment regimen[s]—namely, regular cross-sex hormone treatment or 
gender reassignment surgery confirming the desired gender”). 
 91 AM. MED. ASS’N, REMOVING FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PA-
TIENTS 1 (2008), http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama_resolutions.pdf [perma.cc/H2FE-3PYT]. Ac-
cording to the AMA, 
[A]n established body of medical research demonstrates the effectiveness and medi-
cal necessity of mental health care, hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery 
as forms of therapeutic treatment for many people diagnosed with GID . . . Health 
experts in GID, including WPATH, have rejected the myth that such treatments are 
“cosmetic” or “experimental” and have recognized that these treatments can provide 
safe and effective treatment for a serious health condition. 
Id.; accord Position Statements of the American Psychiatric Association: Access to Care for 
Transgender and Gender Variant Individuals, ASS’N OF LGBTQ PSYCHIATRISTS (2013), http://
www.aglp.org/pages/LGBTPositionStatements.php [perma.cc/H7ZF-WCHP]; Transgender, Gen-
der Identity, and Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (2008), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx [https://perma.cc/F4EH-P4UU]; see also AM. 
MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 011 (A-15): MILITARY MEDICAL POLICIES 
AFFECTING TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 1–2 (2015), http://www.palmcenter.org/files/A-15%20
Resoultion%20011.pdf [https://perma.cc/545N-DQRA] (stating that “treatments for gender dys-
phoria . . . are safe, effective, and medically necessary” and “there is no medically valid reason to 
exclude transgender individuals from service in the US military”); LAMBDA LEGAL, PROFESSION-
AL ORGANIZATION STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN HEALTH CARE 1–4 
(2012), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_professional-
org-statements-supporting-trans-health_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBL9-PG92] (providing list of 
various organizational position statements regarding transgender people). 
 92 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 
(current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988)) (defining “handicap” without 
transgender exclusions). 
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of the plaintiff, a transgender woman, who had her conditional job offer 
revoked after she disclosed her intent to transition.93 The plaintiff brought 
suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.94 The court denied the 
Postal Service’s motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiff “alleged the 
necessary ‘physical or mental impairment’” to state a claim for disability 
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.95 And the following year, in 
Blackwell v. Department of Treasury, the same court reiterated this protec-
tion when a Treasury Department supervisor canceled a job vacancy imme-
diately after interviewing the plaintiff, a transgender woman, “to avoid the 
inevitable administrative hassle that would occur if [the Department] de-
clined a qualified applicant.”96 The court concluded that “transvestism” was 
a covered “handicap” under the Rehabilitation Act, but ultimately held 
against the plaintiff on other grounds.97 When Congress wrote GID out of 
federal disability antidiscrimination law in 1990,98 it therefore deprived 
transgender individuals of protections they once enjoyed. 
Like federal disability antidiscrimination laws, state disability antidis-
crimination laws historically protected people with GID. Prior to the ADA’s 
passage, state disability antidiscrimination laws presented a diverse set of 
definitions for the term “disability” (or “handicap”).99 None of these laws 
explicitly excluded GID.100 Following the ADA’s passage in 1990, many 
states amended their statutes to more closely track the ADA, which was 
widely “regarded as the ‘state of the art’ in disability discrimination.”101 
Today, approximately forty-three states have adopted antidiscrimination 
laws that track the ADA definition of disability virtually verbatim.102 Nota-
bly, only ten of these states have imported the ADA’s exclusions.103 In the 
remaining forty states with no GID exclusion in their antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                           
 93 No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *2–3 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at *2. 
 96 656 F. Supp. 713, 714–15 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 97 Id. at 715 (holding that the plaintiff was refused hire “because [the supervisor] believed he 
was a homosexual (a condition not protected under the Rehabilitation Act)”). 
 98 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of GID from the ADA). 
 99 See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A 
Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 334 
(2003) (discussing state disability laws). 
 100 See id. (discussing state disability laws). One state, Iowa, interpreted its disability nondis-
crimination statute to exclude “transsexualism” pre-ADA. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 476–77 (Iowa 1983). 
 101 Center & Imparato, supra note 99, at 334. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-120 to 16-121 & n.516 (listing ten states where disability 
antidiscrimination laws adopt the ADA’s GID exclusion). 
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statutes, a clear majority of courts and state agencies that have addressed 
the issue have held that GID and Gender Dysphoria are protected disabili-
ties.104 The ADA’s GID exclusion is therefore not representative of state 
disability antidiscrimination law. It is instead a stark anomaly. 
Courts have similarly recognized GID and Gender Dysphoria as seri-
ous medical conditions deserving of protection in a variety of other con-
texts. For example, in the prisoner context, all seven of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals that have been presented with the question have found that GID 
poses a “serious medical need” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.105 
At least one federal court has ruled likewise in the context of civil commit-
ment.106 In 2011, the U.S. Tax Court held that GID “is a serious, psycholog-
ically debilitating condition” within the meaning of the Tax Code and that 
the costs of gender reassignment surgery are deductible—a decision to 
which the IRS subsequently acquiesced.107 And on May 30, 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Departmental Appeals Board 
invalidated its 1989 determination denying Medicare coverage of gender 
reassignment surgery.108 
Furthermore, courts have consistently held that state and local laws 
criminalizing cross-dressing109 are unconstitutional as applied to people 
who dressed in accord with their gender identity pursuant to their “medical-
ly and psychologically necessary” course of treatment for GID.110 For ex-
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. at 16-111 to 16-125. 
 105 See, e.g., O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 62 (2010) (citing cases from various 
U.S. circuit courts that concluded GID constituted “serious medical need”). 
 106 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454–55 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s 
determination that civil inmate’s GID posed “substantial risk of serious harm,” and that State was 
deliberately indifferent to inmate’s medical needs). 
 107 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 61. In November 2011, the IRS issued an Action on Decision 
in which it acquiesced to the Tax Court decision. IRS Announcement Relating to: O’Donnabhain, 
2011-47 I.R.B. 789 (IRS ACQ 2011). 
 108 NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. App. Div., Deci-
sion No. 2576, at 1, 9–10, 2014 WL 2558402, at *1, *7–8 (May 30, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/
dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2576.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP8Q-NT46] (reviewing the National 
Coverage Determination regarding Medicare coverage for transsexual surgery, and acknowledging 
that GID is a “serious medical condition”). 
 109 Many local laws explicitly criminalized cross-dressing; state laws had much the same 
effect by prohibiting “disguise.” See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GEN-
DER AND THE LAW 54 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing St. Louis ordinance of 1864 prohibiting one’s 
appearance “in any public place . . . in a dress not belonging to [one’s] sex,” citing dozens of simi-
lar local ordinances “making it illegal to appear in the attire not of one’s sex” and discussing New 
York statute of 1845 prohibiting one’s “having his face painted, discolored, covered or concealed, 
or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his being identified”). 
 110 See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that Houston cross-
dressing ban violated substantive due process rights of transgender individuals who cross-dress in 
preparation for sex-reassignment surgery). Courts also struck down cross-dressing laws as uncon-
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ample, in 1978, in City of Chicago v. Wilson, the Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected the City’s enforcement of its cross-dressing ban against two 
transgender women who wore female clothing in preparation for gender 
reassignment surgery.111 According to the court, the City’s desire to “pro-
tect[] the public morals” did not outweigh a transgender individual’s “well-
being.”112 The court also found no evidence that “cross-dressing” causes 
any harm to society.113 
Courts have likewise upheld gender designation changes and name 
changes on birth certificates in recognition of the medical treatment for GID 
and the “deep personal, social, and economic interest in having the official 
designation of [one’s] gender match what, in fact, it always was or possibly 
has become.”114 Indeed, today, all states except Tennessee recognize the 
reality of one’s post-transition sex, and a growing number of states permit 
gender designation changes on birth certificates without requiring that the 
person undergo gender reassignment surgery.115 State legislatures and ad-
                                                                                                                           
stitutionally void for vagueness. See City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ohio 
1975) (holding that Columbus city ordinance prohibiting appearance in “dress not belonging to 
[one’s] sex” was unconstitutionally void for vagueness). Similar vagueness challenges resulted in 
the invalidation of ordinances in Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Fort Worth, Miami Beach, St. Lou-
is, and other jurisdictions. See I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 1, 10 (2008) (discussing cases from these cities invalidating cross-dressing statutes). 
 111 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (“There is no evidence, however, that cross-dressing, when done as part of a pre-
operative therapy program or otherwise, is . . . harmful to society . . . . Individuals contemplating 
[sex-reassignment] surgery should . . . be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure the 
correctness of their decision.”). 
 114 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 79 (Md. 2003); see, e.g., id. at 87 (vacating trial court’s denial 
of petitioner’s request to amend gender designation on birth certificate and remanding for deter-
mination of whether petitioner had provided “sufficient medical evidence” of gender change); 
accord Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Conn. 1975) (holding that transgender 
plaintiff stated claim that State Commissioner of Health violated Equal Protection Clause by re-
fusing to change plaintiff’s gender designation on birth certificate); In re Petition for Change of 
Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d 707, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing trial court’s denial of petition 
requesting change of gender designation on birth certificate based on “ample medical evidence” of 
gender transition); In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859, 860 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (ordering trial 
court to grant petitioner’s name-change request based on “medically and psychiatrically indicated” 
need for surgical sex reassignment). 
 115 See Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, LAMBDA 
LEGAL (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/changing-birth-certificate-sex-
designations-state-by-state-guidelines [https://perma.cc/5YNR-SDZT] (providing instructions on 
how to change the sex designation on a birth certificate in each state); Joseph De Avila, Changing 
Gender Designation: Connecticut Passes Bill That Would Allow Transgender People who Have 
Transitioned to Amend Birth Records, WALL STREET J. (June 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/changing-gender-designation-1433206274 [https://perma.cc/D5KJ-Z37Y] (discussing 
Connecticut law modernizing birth certificate amendment process); see also Press Release, AM. 
MED. ASS’N, AMA Calls for Modernizing Birth Certificate Policies (June 9, 2014), http://
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ministrative agencies have similarly extended protections to transgender 
people with GID and Gender Dysphoria by requiring coverage of gender 
reassignment surgery under Medicaid116 as well as under private insurance 
plans.117 
II. TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE ADA 
Although the ADA is not the only federal statute that facially discrimi-
nates against transgender people, the ADA’s transgender classification is 
important because it perpetuates the very stigma the ADA seeks to disman-
tle. It is also the first federal transgender classification to be challenged un-
der the Equal Protection Clause. For these reasons, this Article discusses the 
classification in some detail. 
The ADA excludes from coverage eleven medical conditions, includ-
ing three associated with transgender people: “transvestism, transsexualism 
. . . [and] gender identity disorders.”118 These exclusions have no founda-
tion in either medicine or law. Indeed, the exclusions contradict the opinion 
of the international medical community and the courts.119 Why, then, were 
they excluded from the ADA? The answer is straightforward: moral animus. 
The ADA’s legislative history plainly demonstrates how two U.S. Senators 
excluded all medical conditions associated with transgender people in a fe-
verish attempt to deny ADA coverage to mental conditions deemed morally 
unfit.120 
The moral animus underlying the ADA’s exclusion of transgender peo-
ple is rooted in two earlier attempts—one successful, and one unsuccess-
ful—to exclude transgender people from other antidiscrimination laws. Sec-
                                                                                                                           
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-06-09-modernizing-birth-certificate-policies.
page [https://perma.cc/NY3Y-GALP] (supporting gender-designation changes without require-
ment of surgery). 
 116 Victory! Connecticut Removes Barrier for Medicaid Coverage of Transgender Health 
Care, GLAD (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.glad.org/current/item/victory-connecticut-removes-
barrier-for-medicaid-coverage-of-transgender-he [https://perma.cc/8VC2-T6B5] (discussing Med-
icaid coverage for treatment of Gender Dysphoria in Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, New 
York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.). 
 117 Parker Marie Malloy, Connecticut Becomes Fifth State to Require Transgender Medical 
Coverage, THE ADVOCATE (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2013/
12/31/connecticut-becomes-fifth-state-require-transgender-medical-coverage [https://perma.cc/
L9VY-KBMD] (stating that Connecticut, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont “require 
health insurance providers to cover treatments related to gender transition”). 
 118 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012). 
 119 See supra notes 42–117 and accompanying text (discussing the medical community’s and 
courts’ recognition of conditions associated with transgender people). 
 120 See infra notes 138–202 and accompanying text (discussing congressional debate of 
transgender exclusions). 
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tion A of this Part discusses the legislative history behind these earlier at-
tempts.121 Section B then turns to the legislative history behind the ADA’s 
transgender exclusion.122  
A. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 and the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988 
The first attempt at excluding transgender people from antidiscrimina-
tion laws came in May of 1988, during floor debate in the Senate over 
whether to override President Ronald Reagan’s veto of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act.123 Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina argued unsuc-
cessfully against an override on grounds that the Act would extend protec-
tion to “transvestites” under the Rehabilitation Act.124 His justification for 
excluding “transvestites” was overtly moral. “[H]andicaps,” he argued, “are 
diseases which have no conceivable moral content and yet have been asso-
ciated in the past with irrational fears—such as epilepsy—or else physical 
impairments . . . . Transvestism and other compulsions or addi[c]tions,” by 
contrast, were considered by some to be “moral problems, not mental hand-
icaps.”125 Therefore, by extending protection to “transvestites,” Congress 
wrongly “open[s] for the courts the opportunity to eliminate the entire con-
cept of a moral qualification for any job, position, or privilege . . . by refer-
ring to the strong trend in psychiatry to classify almost all compulsive or 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See infra notes 123–137 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra notes 138–202 and accompanying text. 
 123 The purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 was to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s 1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell, which limited the application of Title IX and 
other federal antidiscrimination laws. 465 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1984). 
 124 134 CONG. REC. 4236 (1988) (statement of Sen. Helms), available at 1988 WL 1084657. 
According to the DSM, “Transvestism” (renamed “Transvestic Fetishism” under the DSM-III-R 
(1987) and, under the DSM-5, now called “Transvestic Disorder”) is highly specific—it refers to 
sexual arousal from cross-dressing that results in significant distress or impairment. See DSM-5, 
supra note 13, at 458 (defining “Transvestic Disorder”). Although Senator Helms undoubtedly 
had the concept of “sexual arousal from cross-dressing” in mind when he referred to “transves-
tites” during debate on the Civil Rights Restoration Act, it is reasonable to assume that he also had 
in mind a broader swath of the transgender community—namely, males who cross-dress (without 
sexual arousal) and people who have undergone gender transition. See Ray Blanchard, The DSM 
Diagnostic Criteria for Transvestic Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 363, 365 (2009) 
(stating that “the term transvestism . . . was then, as now, sometimes used to denote cross-dressing 
homosexual men (‘drag queens’), and . . . ha[s] historically also been used to denote transsexu-
als”). 
 125 134 CONG. REC. 4236 (statement of Sen. Helms), available at 1988 WL 1084657. 
528 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:507 
destructive behavior patterns as discrete and medically treatable diseas-
es.”126 Senator Helms asked rhetorically, 
Do we really want private institutions, particularly schools and 
day care centers to be prohibited from refusing to hire a transves-
tite because some Federal court may find that this violates the 
transvestite’s civil rights to wear a dress and to wear foam, that 
sort of thing? Do we really want to prohibit these private institu-
tions from making employment decisions based on moral qualifi-
cations?127 
In support of his argument, Senator Helms cited the 1985 case of Doe 
v. U.S. Postal Service and the 1986 case of Blackwell v. U.S. Department of 
Treasury, in which federal district courts held—wrongly, in his opinion—
that transsexualism and transvestism, respectively, were covered “handi-
caps” under the Rehabilitation Act.128 Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachu-
setts dismissed Senator Helms’s argument as the fear-mongering of the 
“moral majority,” which aimed to defeat passage of the Restoration Act by 
claiming that it would extend civil rights protections to gays and lesbians.129 
Senator Helms’s moral arguments failed, and Congress voted 73–24 to 
override the President’s veto.130 
The second attempt at transgender exclusion came approximately five 
months later, on August 1, 1988, when the Senate considered amendments 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. (“[T]his bill opens the way for private institutions all over the country to find them-
selves forced to justify exclusion of various behaviorally handicapped persons from benefits by 
evidence from medical doctors and other experts, but not from morals or theology.”). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Blackwell v. Dep’t of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713, 714–15 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 
84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *2–3 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); see also supra notes 93–97 and accom-
panying text (discussing Doe and Blackwell). Senator Helms was not alone in his moral opposition 
to “transvestites.” Senator Steve Symms of Idaho called civil rights protection of transvestites 
“rediculous [sic]” and an abdication of Congress’s “moral authority to legislate rules for the rest of 
society.” 134 CONG. REC. 4248 (1988), available at 1988 WL 1084659 (quoting Editorial, Above 
the Law, WALL STREET J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 24). 
 129 See Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 38 (2004) (discussing legislative history). The Moral Majority, a 
conservative lobbying firm led by Jerry Falwell and Jerry Nims, warned that the Restoration Act 
would “protect active homosexuals, transvestites, alcoholics and drug addicts, among others, un-
der the government’s antidiscrimination laws. These sins will be considered to be diseases or 
handicaps” under “this perverted law.” 134 CONG. REC. 4602 (1988), available at 1988 WL 
1084953. 
 130 See Colker, supra note 129, at 38 (discussing the Civil Rights Restoration Act’s legislative 
history). 
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to the Fair Housing Act.131 Senator Helms again argued against civil rights 
protection for transgender people. Citing Blackwell, Senator Helms pro-
posed an amendment excluding transvestism from the definition of “handi-
cap” under the Fair Housing Act.132 “My amendment is an attempt to put a 
little common sense back into the equation,” he explained.133 “[I]t should be 
clear to the courts that Congress does not intend for transvestites to receive 
the benefits and protections that is [sic] provided for handicapped individu-
als.”134 This time, Senator Helms succeeded, with the Senate voting 89–2 in 
favor of the amendment, making the Fair Housing Act the first antidiscrimi-
nation law to explicitly exclude transgender people.135 The concern of Sena-
tor Alan Cranston, one of two senators to oppose Senator Helm’s amend-
ment,136 proved prescient: “If we remove protections from one form of dis-
ability, who will be next?”137 
Congress did not have to wait long to find out. The Pandora’s box of 
moral animus, once opened, would not be easily sealed, as the ADA’s legis-
lative history demonstrates. 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
On May 9, 1989, Senators Tom Harkin of Iowa and Ted Kennedy, 
along with thirty-two co-sponsors, introduced the Americans with Disabili-
                                                                                                                           
 131 See 134 CONG. REC. 19,711–51 (1988) (on file with authors) (discussing the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act in the Senate). 
 132 Id. at 19,727 (statement of Sen. Helms). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 19,728. 
 136 Id. (statement of Sen. Cranston). Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut also voted 
against Senator Helms’s Fair Housing Act amendment. Id. Senator William Armstrong of Colora-
do was among those who voted for the amendment. 
 137 Id. Senator Cranston voiced his staunch opposition to the amendment: 
[T]he Senator from North Carolina has singled out for exclusion a disability that is 
considered by the American Psychiatric Association to be a mental disorder. Despite 
our efforts over the years to eliminate the stigma of mental illnesses, persons with 
mental illness are still frequently the subject of discrimination because some indi-
viduals have irrational fears about them and are made uncomfortable by them. This 
amendment would single out one category of individuals who are already being dis-
criminated against and say to them, “Sorry you now have no protections. Congress 
has decided that it no longer cares whether or not you are cast out of our society.” 
. . . . This amendment could open the door to any number of attempts to exclude 
other disabilities from this and other antidiscrimination laws . . . . [T]he whole pur-
pose of the Fair Housing Act and other antidiscrimination laws is to provide across-
the-board evenhanded protection, not to pick and choose disabilities we approve of 
and exclude the ones we don’t. 
Id. 
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ties Act.138 Over the next several months, Congress held numerous hearings 
to consider the ADA.139 Significantly, no attempt was made to exclude par-
ticular impairments, mental or physical, from the ADA’s definition of disa-
bility. Instead, Congress deliberately went in the opposite direction, borrow-
ing the definition of disability used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which 
included all impairments—past, present, and perceived—so long as they 
“substantially limited” a “major life activity.”140 But this comprehensive 
definition soon met opposition in both the House and Senate.  
1. Transgender Exclusions and the Senate 
Support for an inclusive definition of disability abruptly changed dur-
ing the Senate floor debate on the ADA on September 7, 1989, driven in 
large part by the moral animus of two senators.141 Late in the day, Senator 
William Armstrong of Colorado came to the floor and expressed his con-
cerns with the ADA’s definition of disability—specifically, its coverage of 
certain mental impairments that “might have a moral content to them or 
which in the opinion of some people have a moral content.”142 According to 
Senator Armstrong, although “the ideals of our country certainly call upon 
the Senate to do whatever it can to be helpful to people in wheelchairs or 
who have some kind of a physical disability or handicap of some sort and 
who are trying to overcome it,” the ADA wrongly extended coverage to 
“some things which by any ordinary definition we would not expect to be 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 86 (2010), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1997/equality_
of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_Americans_with_Disabilities_Act [https://perma.cc/QC6V-
SCLR] [hereinafter NCD, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY] (discussing legislative history). 
 139 Id. (discussing hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources’ 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, on May 9, 10, and 16, and June 22, 1989). 
 140 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 
1619 (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988)) (defining “handicap” with-
out transgender exclusions). According to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
report, 
It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, dis-
eases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments because of 
the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light 
of the fact that new disorders may develop in the future. 
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (on file with authors) (discussing the definition of the term 
“disability” in the ADA). 
 141 See 135 CONG. REC. 19,885 (statement of Sen. Hatch), available at 1989 WL 183216 
(noting that ADA’s “sweeping” inclusion of all mental impairments was “ignored” until Senator 
Armstrong raised this issue during floor debate). 
 142 Id. at 19,853 (statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 183115. 
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included.”143 Noting that the ADA’s coverage of mental impairments was 
“appealing to the heart” but ought to “give our heads some concern,” Sena-
tor Armstrong added that he planned to introduce an amendment “that will 
take voyeurism and some other [mental impairments listed in the DSM-III-
R] out.”144 
Echoing Senator Armstrong’s moral concerns, Senator Helms protest-
ed that the ADA “den[ied] the small businessman . . . the right to run his 
company as he sees fit.”145 Specifically, the ADA deprived the employer of 
the right to make judgments about employees based on the employer’s 
“own moral standards,” with a particular emphasis on homosexuality and 
HIV status.146 Senator Helms elaborated: 
If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair or those who 
have been injured in the war, that is one thing. But how in the 
world did you get to the place that you did not even [ex]clude 
transvestites? How did you get into this business of classifying 
people who are HIV positive, most of whom are drug addicts or 
homosexuals or bisexuals, as disabled? . . . What I get out of all 
of this is here comes the U.S. Government telling the employer 
that he cannot set up any moral standards for his business by ask-
ing someone if he is HIV positive, even though 85 percent of 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. at 19,852–53 (statement of Sen. Armstrong). Specifically, the ADA’s definition of 
disability covered a range of “[m]ental disorders,” including “homosexuality and bisexuality,” 
“exhibitionism, pedophilia, voyeurism,” “compulsive kleptomania, or other impulse control disor-
ders,” “conduct disorder,” and “any other disruptive behavior disorder.” Id. at 19,853. 
 144 Id. at 19,871, available at 1989 WL 183216. Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire 
likewise objected to the breadth of the ADA’s definition of disability, particularly its coverage of 
alcoholism, drug addiction, compulsive gambling, pedophilia, kleptomania, and other “socially 
unacceptable, often illegal, behavior.” Id. at 19,896 (statement of Sen. Rudman). Senator Rudman 
further stated, 
A diagnosis of certain types of mental illness is frequently made on the basis of a 
pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks any physiological basis. In short, 
we are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and which indi-
viduals are engaging in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not fully 
understand . . . . [P]eople must bear some responsibility for the consequences of 
their own actions. 
Id. 
 145 Id. at 19,864 (statement of Sen. Helms). 
 146 Id. Helms argued that: 
[Employers should have the right to] sit down and say, son, I want to talk to you 
about several things that are important to me as the owner of this [business]. Are 
you HIV positive? Are you this or that? Because your condition and beliefs are im-
portant to me in the operation of my [business]. 
Id. at 19,867. 
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those people are engaged in activities that most Americans find 
abhorrent. That is one of the problems I find with this bill . . . . 
[H]e cannot say, look I feel very strongly about people who en-
gage in sexually deviant behavior or unlawful sexual practices.147 
Senator Helms pressed the sponsors on the ADA’s coverage of five 
groups of individuals: (1) “homosexuals”; (2) “people who are HIV positive 
or have active AIDS disease”; (3) those with “a history of psychosis, neuro-
sis, or mental or psychological difficulties or disorder[s],” including pedo-
philia, schizophrenia, kleptomania, manic depression, intellectual disabili-
ties, and psychotic disorders; (4) “transvestites”; and (5) illegal drug us-
ers.148  
On the other side, two Senators argued against Senators Armstrong and 
Helms in support of the ADA’s broader coverage, but remained silent on the 
issue of transgender inclusion. Responding to Senator Helms’s concerns 
about coverage of homosexuality under the ADA, Senator Harkin clarified 
that homosexuals were “absolutely not” covered by the ADA because “be-
havior characteristics . . . [such as] homosexuality and bisexuality are not 
disabilities under any medical standards.”149 Rejecting Senator Helms’s ob-
jection that coverage of HIV/AIDS was a backdoor way of covering homo-
sexuals,150 Senators Harkin and Kennedy strongly defended the ADA’s cov-
erage of people with HIV/AIDS.151 Citing the letters of over 250 organiza-
tions and advocacy groups supporting the ADA’s coverage of people with 
HIV/AIDS, Senator Kennedy stated that such coverage was “completely 
consistent with public health policy” and warned that, if Congress “fail[ed] 
to provide this protection, we will continue to drive this epidemic under-
ground.”152 As a result, no amendment was offered to exclude HIV/AIDS 
during the Senate floor debate.153 
In response to Senator Helms’s opposition to the inclusion of those 
with a “history of psychosis, neurosis, or mental or psychological difficul-
ties or disorder[s],” Senator Harkin argued passionately for coverage, ex-
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. at 19,870. 
 148 Id. at 19,866  
 149 Id. at 19,885 (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
 150 Id. at 19,865 (statement of Sen. Helms) (expressing concern that ADA was “going up one 
side of the street and down the other on its definitions” by protecting HIV-positive people in the 
United States, “85 percent of [whom] are drug users and/or homosexuals”). 
 151 Id. (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“It is people who have AIDS and HIV infection who are 
covered on the basis of those disabilities.”). 
 152 Id. at 19,867 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 153 See Colker, supra note 129, at 36 (noting that the legislative history of the ADA reflects “a 
sincere and widespread desire” to help HIV-positive individuals, “even when that protection 
threatened to derail passage of the ADA”). 
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plaining that “being handicapped” includes not only physical disabilities but 
mental disabilities as well.154 Senator Harkin argued that the purpose of the 
ADA is to dismantle the fear and prejudice surrounding both physical and 
mental disability.155 Across the aisle, Republican Senator Pete Domenici of 
New Mexico likewise defended the ADA’s inclusion of various mental im-
pairments, stating that “the time has arrived in the United States when peo-
ple who have mental illnesses . . . [should] not be automatically discrimi-
nated against for employment in this country.”156 
In contrast to the vigorous support of ADA coverage for people with 
HIV/AIDS, bipolar disorder (“manic depression”), schizophrenia, and relat-
ed mental disorders, there was literally no support for coverage of medical 
conditions associated with transgender people. Indeed, in response to Sena-
tor Helms’s objection to the ADA’s coverage of “transvestites,” Senator 
Harkin immediately accepted Senator Helms’s Amendment 717 excluding 
“transvestites,” citing Senator Helms’s identical amendment excluding 
transvestites from the Fair Housing Act the previous year.157  
Late in the day, Senator Armstrong distributed his proposed amend-
ment—a “long list of various kinds of conduct . . . extracted from the DSM 
III[-R]”—to Senators Harkin, Kennedy, Bob Dole of Kansas, and Orrin 
Hatch of Utah.158 Although disability rights advocates recommended put-
ting the proposed amendment to an up-or-down vote, which they predicted 
                                                                                                                           
 154 135 CONG. REC. 19,866 (statement of Sen. Harkin), available at 1989 WL 183216. “Some 
people only think of people who are physically disabled as being handicapped,” Harkin stated. 
“People can be mentally handicapped as well.” Id. 
 155 Id. According to Senator Harkin: 
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about people with disabili-
ties, unfounded fears, whether people have mental disorders, whether they are manic 
depressives or schizophrenia or paranoia, or unfounded fears and prejudices based 
upon physical disabilities. The point of the [ADA] is to start breaking down those 
barriers of fear and prejudice and unfounded fears, to get past that point so that peo-
ple begin to look at people based on their abilities, not first looking at their disabil-
ity. 
Id. 
 156 Id. at 19,878. 
 157 Id. at 19,864; see supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (discussing Fair Housing 
Act amendment). Amendment 717 stated that: “For the purposes of this Act, the term ‘disabled’ or 
‘disability’ shall not apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.” 135 
CONG. REC. 19,883 (1989), available at 1989 WL 183216. Senator Harkin also reluctantly agreed 
to Senator Helms’s conforming amendment excluding those currently using illegal drugs from the 
Rehabilitation Act; an identical amendment excluded illegal drug use from the ADA. Id. (discuss-
ing Amendments 715 and 718). 
 158 135 CONG. REC. 19,871 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (lamenting that they received 
Senator Helms’s amendment “late [in the] afternoon” and that they were “trying to determine the 
best approach for proceeding”). 
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would fail, the bill’s sponsors’ staff insisted on negotiating the amendment 
with Senator Armstrong.159 Staff further insisted that “homosexuality and 
bisexuality” be in the negotiated list of exclusions.160 Disability rights ad-
vocates reduced the list to approximately five conditions, which included 
homosexuality, bisexuality, and kleptomania but not any of the transgender 
exclusions.161 Dissatisfied with the meager list of exclusions, Senator Hatch 
entered the Senate antechamber and personally told disability rights advo-
cates that he “needed some more.”162 Advocates reluctantly obliged, select-
ing the three conditions associated with transgender people and six other 
conditions for exclusion from the ADA.163 Senator Armstrong introduced 
the negotiated list of fourteen exclusions as Amendment 722, which read: 
Under this act the term “disability” does not include “homosexuali-
ty,” “bisexuality,” “transvestism,” “pedophilia,” “transsexualism,” 
“exhibitionism,” “voyeurism,” “compulsive gambling,” “klepto-
mania,” or “pyromania,” “gender identity disorders,” current “psy-
choactive substance use disorders,” current “psychoactive sub-
stance-induced organic mental disorders,” as defined by DSM-III-
R which are not the result of medical treatment, or other “sexual 
behavior disorders.”164 
The transgender exclusions contained in Senator Armstrong’s amend-
ment betray a stunning lack of congressional deliberation. Under the DSM 
in effect at the time of the Senate floor debate, “transsexualism” was a sub-
type of GID, making its exclusion superfluous in light of the GID exclu-
sion.165 Likewise, the diagnosis of “transvestism” no longer existed in the 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgen-
der People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 23–24 (2013) (detailing the off-the-record ex-
change regarding the proposed amendment). 
 160 Id. at 24. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id.; see also NCD, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 138, at 99 (stating that Sena-
tors Kennedy and Harkin “worked with Armstrong and Hatch for hours, in consultation with the 
disability community, to prepare a list” of excluded impairments, and “Senator Hatch typed the 
amendment himself”). 
 163 The final list hued closely to the floor debate; all impairments except GID and pyromania 
were explicitly mentioned by Senator Armstrong either on the Senate floor or in his statement 
published one week later. See 135 CONG. REC. 20,571–74 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), 
available at 1989 WL 183785. 
 164 135 CONG. REC. 19,831 (1989) (discussing Amendment 722), available at 1989 WL 
183216. The House’s version of the ADA removed the exclusion of “current psychoactive sub-
stance-induced organic mental disorders.” See infra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing 
House’s modified list of exclusions). 
 165 See DSM-III-R, supra note 60, at 71–78 (classifying transsexualism as a subtype of GID). 
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DSM; it had been replaced nine years earlier by “transvestic fetishism.”166 
Furthermore, the amendment’s exclusion of “transvestism” was entirely 
redundant, as Senator Helms had already suggested an amendment to the 
ADA excluding “transvestites,” and Senator Harkin had agreed to it.167 In 
spite of this, Amendment 722 was accepted, and the Senate passed the 
ADA, as amended, by a vote of 76–8.168 
On September 14, 1989, seven days after the ADA’s passage in the 
Senate but prior to its passage in the House of Representatives, Senator 
Armstrong cited excessive litigation as another reason for his opposition to 
the ADA’s coverage of a variety of mental impairments, including those 
impairments associated with transgender people.169 In a statement submitted 
into the congressional record, entitled “ADA, Mental Impairments, and the 
Private Sector,” Senator Armstrong warned that the private sector would be 
“swamped” by a flood of “egregious” mental disability litigation if the 
ADA’s broad definition of disability were to become law.170 
For each condition, Senator Armstrong summarized one or more cases 
in which courts found such conditions to be disabilities under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973.171 Significantly, his summaries contain no analysis of 
why lawsuits brought by plaintiffs with these conditions were necessarily 
“egregious.”172 Indeed, in all but two of the fifteen cited cases, the employ-
ers ultimately won because the plaintiffs were found to be unqualified for 
the job or a direct threat to themselves and others.173 This hardly seems like 
an “egregious” result for employers. Furthermore, the facts of many of the 
cases were plainly sympathetic. For example, Senator Armstrong cited Doe, 
in which the plaintiff’s conditional job offer was revoked after she disclosed 
her intent to transition to the other sex.174 Describing the case as a “sad” 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-155 to 16-156 (discussing the DSM’s treatment of “trans-
vestism”). 
 167 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Helms’s Amendment 717 
to remove “transvestites”). 
 168 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989), available at 1989 WL 183216. 
 169 135 CONG. REC. 20,574 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 
183785. 
 170 Id. “Private employers,” he stated, “prepare yourselves for lawsuits based on the following 
types of mental conditions! . . . [C]ompulsive gambling . . . acrophobia (fear of heights) . . . de-
pressive neurosis . . . paranoid schizophrenia . . . manic depression . . . borderline personality dis-
order . . . schizoid personality disorder . . . sexuality disorders: transvestism and transsexualism 
. . . . stress disorders . . . [and] miscellaneous mental disorders . . . .” Id. at 20,572. 
 171 Id. at 20,572–74. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Doe, 1985 WL 9446, at *1; see also supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing 
Doe). 
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one, the court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss and held that the 
plaintiff stated a claim for “disability” discrimination.175 
Likewise, Senator Armstrong cited Blackwell, in which an employer 
canceled a job vacancy just hours after interviewing the plaintiff, a 
transgender woman.176 Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s priority hiring cre-
dentials177 and the interviewer’s recommendation that the plaintiff be hired, 
the employer removed the posting to evade “the administrative hassle” with 
rejecting a qualified applicant.178 Characterizing the employer’s actions as 
“highly reprehensible,” the court nevertheless held that, while “transves-
tism” was a covered disability under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff 
was not entitled to relief because she was not able to prove that she was re-
fused hire on that basis.179 
The facts from other cases cited by Armstrong are far from “egre-
gious,” and indeed seem tragic, involving precisely the qualified individuals 
that the ADA was intended to protect. They include the termination of a 
staff psychologist with depressive-neurosis because she had threatened to 
commit suicide, even though she had received “outstanding” job reviews;180 
the denial of admission to a medical school candidate with bipolar disorder 
because of self-destructive behavior, even though she had not experienced 
symptoms in several years as she obtained a master’s degree at Harvard; 181 
and the termination of a twenty-two-year veteran of the FBI with a gam-
bling addiction who had gambled away $2000 in government funds, even 
though he immediately sought treatment for his addiction and no longer 
gambled, and the FBI director recommended against his termination.182  
Senator Armstrong also offered no support for his argument that cov-
erage of various mental impairments would necessarily lead to a deluge of 
claims.183 The cases cited by Armstrong indicate no flood of litigation under 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Doe, 1985 WL 9446, at *1, *3. 
 176 Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at 714; see also supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Blackwell). 
 177 See Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at 714 (noting that the plaintiff had worked for nearly ten 
years in other branches of the Treasury Department, and had been laid off due to a reduction in 
force). 
 178 Id. at 715 (“[The supervisor] knew [the] plaintiff could do the job and had no sound basis 
for even refusing to accept him for the job.”). 
 179 Id. The court stated that the plaintiff was instead refused hire because the supervisor be-
lieved he was a homosexual, which is not protected under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. 
 180 Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm’n, 705 F.2d 1402, 1404–05, 
1409 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 181 Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 182 Rezza v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 87-6732, 1988 WL 48541, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 
1988). 
 183 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (stating that mental impairment litigation under 
ADA would “swamp” private sector). 
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the Rehabilitation Act with respect to such impairments and, even if they 
did, Congress has never seen the potential for lawsuits “as reason to restrict 
classes of antidiscrimination coverage.”184 Furthermore, if litigation were 
Senator Armstrong’s true concern, statistics suggest that he should have tar-
geted orthopedic impairments, not (or not only) mental ones.185 
In sum, Senator Armstrong’s flood-of-“egregious”-mental-disability-
litigation argument is without merit because the cases he cites were neither 
egregious nor indicative of a flood of litigation.186 Instead, this argument 
against coverage for various mental impairments reduces to pure moral op-
position; the fact that a transgender person—or a person with a gambling 
addiction or any number of other mental impairments—would dare to assert 
his or her rights under the Rehabilitation Act was “egregious” in and of it-
self.187  
2. Transgender Exclusions in the House of Representatives 
When the ADA moved to the House of Representatives for debate, 
coverage of HIV/AIDS was once again in controversy and, once again, pre-
vailed.188 Nevertheless, the ADA’s transgender exclusions once again met 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 511 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 185 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFO., & PLANNING, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
ADA CHARGE DATA BY IMPAIRMENT/BASES—RECEIPTS FY 1997–FY 2015, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.cfm [https://perma.cc/GW52-ZK4V] (providing data of charges 
based on various impairments between 1997 and 2015). 
 186 135 CONG. REC. 20,574 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 
183785. 
 187 It did not matter to Senator Armstrong that such a person might not ultimately prevail in 
his or her discrimination claim because the impairment did not “substantially limit” a “major life 
activity,” the person was not qualified to perform the job, the person was a direct threat to safety, 
or the person was not discriminated against based on the disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12111(3), 
12111(8), 12112(a) (2012); see also 135 CONG. REC. 19,885 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin), 
available at 1989 WL 183216 (“[I]ndividuals with many of the other behavior characteristics 
included on this list [of exclusions], which would have been considered disabilities under this act, 
in many situations, such individuals would not have been qualified for various employment posi-
tions, for example. Therefore, this amendment was particularly unnecessary.”). What mattered to 
Senator Armstrong was that such a person would have a discrimination claim at all. Better, then, 
to exclude from the outset those impairments “which by any ordinary definition we would not 
expect to be included”—those with “a moral content to them.” 135 CONG. REC. 19,852–53 (1989) 
(statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 183115. 
 188 Colker, supra note 129, at 46. Fears arose that the ADA “would bankrupt the restaurant 
industry by forcing employers to hire individuals who are HIV-positive, which would cause the 
public to perceive that their food was unsafe.” Id. In response, Representative Jim Chapman of 
Texas offered an amendment allowing a food service employer to deny employment to people 
with HIV/AIDS and other significant infectious diseases. Id. (citing 136 CONG. REC. H17296 
(daily ed. July 12, 1990)). Many legislators opposed the amendment, arguing that it contradicted 
the ADA’s purpose by permitting irrational discrimination. NCD, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, 
supra note 138, at 131. Representative Ted Weiss argued that it “fl[ew] in the face of the very 
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no opposition at all. The House modified the list of excluded mental im-
pairments to read: 
(a) Homosexuality and bisexuality 
For purposes of the definition of “disability” in section 12102(2) 
of this title, homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments 
and as such are not disabilities under this chapter. 
(b) Certain conditions 
Under this chapter, the term “disability” shall not include— 
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, vo-
yeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; 
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or 
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current il-
legal use of drugs.189 
While modest, the House’s modifications underscore the moral animus 
that fueled the ADA’s transgender exclusions. First, the House subdivided 
the list into two separate subsections, “Homosexuality and Bisexuality” and 
“Certain Conditions.”190 Under the former, the House clarified that homo-
sexuality and bisexuality were excluded from the ADA because they “are 
not impairments and as such are not disabilities.”191 Under the latter, the 
House listed eleven impairments drawn from the DSM-III-R, including the 
three impairments associated with transgender people.192 In so doing, the 
House made abundantly clear that transvestism, GID, and transsexualism 
were excluded, not because they were not medical conditions, but rather 
                                                                                                                           
purpose of the ADA by institutionalizing irrational discrimination,” and Representative Hamilton 
Fish argued that Congress “should not make exceptions to the principle in ADA that employment 
decisions should not be based on myth or stereotype . . . . Congress must not enshrine ignorance 
and prejudice in the law.” Id. (citation omitted). The amendment narrowly passed the House but 
was replaced at conference with a far more moderate version, which allows an employer to deny 
employment to a person with an infectious or communicable disease only if the disease is one that 
is “transmitted to others through the handling of food” as determined by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2012); see Colker, supra note 129, at 48 (discussing the 
passage of the amendment in the Senate and at conference). 
 189 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)–(b). The House’s version of the ADA removed the exclusion of 
“current psychoactive substance-induced organic mental disorders,” bringing the ADA’s total list 
of exclusions to thirteen. Compare id., with supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing 
Senator Armstrong’s amendment). 
 190 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)–(b). 
 191 Id. § 12211(a). 
 192 Id. § 12211(b). 
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because the people who had these conditions (transgender people) were 
deemed so depraved as to be unworthy of civil rights protection.193 
Second, the House version further clarified Congress’s belief that GID 
and transsexualism were “sexual behavior disorders.”194 But Congress was 
wrong. GID and transsexualism were never sexual behavior disorders; their 
exclusion was based on a mischaracterization of the medical literature, 
namely, the erroneous conflation of sexual behavior disorders with gender 
identity disorders. Since its inception in 1952 and continuing through to the 
present, the DSM has included a classification for sexual disorders, now 
referred to as “Paraphilic Disorders.”195 According to the DSM-5, Para-
philic Disorders refer to “any intense and persistent sexual interest”—other 
than sexual interest in “copulation or equivalent interaction” with “a physi-
cally mature, consenting human partner”—which either causes distress or 
“entail[s] personal harm or risk of harm, to others.”196 While the placement 
of GID and transsexualism in the DSM changed over time,197 these condi-
tions were never classified as disorders of sexual behavior. Rather, they 
were always grouped separately from the Paraphilic Disorders.198 In fact, 
the DSM-III-R, the version in effect at the time of the ADA’s passage, 
viewed GID as a disorder “usually first evident in infancy, childhood, or 
adolescence,” alongside eating disorders and developmental disorders—“a 
classification hardly suggestive of a sexual behavior disorder.”199 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id. § 12211(a)–(b); see also supra notes 141–187 and accompanying text (discussing evi-
dence of moral animus in Senate floor debate). 
 194 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (characterizing transgender exclusions as “sexual behavior disor-
ders”); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(IV), at 80–81 (1990) (providing dissenting views of Repre-
sentatives Dannemeyer, Barton, and Ritter, stating that “[s]ubparagraph (1) lists six sexual behav-
ioral disorders and ends with a generic reference to ‘other sexual behavior disorders’”); 135 
CONG. REC. 20,573 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 183785 (label-
ing “Transsexualism” a “Sexual Disorder”); 135 CONG. REC. 19,870 (1989) (statement of Sen. 
Helms), available at 1989 WL 183216 (discussing exclusion of “sexually deviant behavior or 
unlawful sexual practices”); 135 CONG. REC. 19,831 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), avail-
able at 1989 WL 183216 (offering amendment characterizing GID and transsexualism as “sexual 
behavior disorders”). 
 195 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 685; see also Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-153 to 16-158 (show-
ing evolution of Paraphilic Disorders in DSM). 
 196 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 685–86. 
 197 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-153 to 16-158 (showing evolution of Paraphilic Disorders 
in DSM). 
 198 See id. The ICD-10, published in 1990, likewise distinguishes “Gender Identity Disorder” 
from “Disorders of Sexual Preference,” such as “Fetishism,” “Fetishistic transvestism,” “Exhibi-
tionism,” “Voyeurism,” “Paedophilia,” and “Sadomasochism.” ICD-10, supra note 50, at F64–
F65. 
 199 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-88 (discussing classification of GID in various editions of 
the DSM). Two successive editions of the DSM, the DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-TR (2000), 
carried this distinction forward, viewing GID as a condition that implicates gender, not sexual 
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Finally, the House inserted the words “not resulting from physical im-
pairments” after “gender identity disorders,” presumably to cover those 
whose gender identity disorder was attributable to a morally neutral physi-
cal impairment, not an “immoral, improper” mental disorder for which a 
person “should bear some responsibility.”200  
The House’s version of excluded impairments was accepted at confer-
ence and became law when the ADA was signed on July 26, 1990.201 Two 
years later, on October 29, 1992, Congress passed an identical exclusion to 
the Rehabilitation Act.202 
III. TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Few cases have addressed the ADA’s transgender exclusions, and no 
published case has analyzed their constitutionality.203 In fact, no case has 
                                                                                                                           
behavior. See id. In sweeping fashion, the DSM-5 sharply disassociates Gender Dysphoria from 
all other conditions, including Paraphilic Disorders. Id. In so doing, the DSM-5 makes abundantly 
clear that Gender Dysphoria, in a class all its own, is not a disorder of sexual behavior. Indeed, it 
is not a “disorder” at all—it is a dysphoria. 
 200 See 135 CONG. REC. 19,896 (1989) (statement of Sen. Rudman), available at 1989 WL 
183216 (supporting Senator Armstrong’s amendment and stating that “people must bear some 
responsibility for the consequences of their own actions”). The ADA does not define the phrase 
“not resulting from physical impairments,” nor does the ADA’s legislative history shed any light. 
Second Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 80, at 2. While it seems clear that the 
physical-impairment safe harbor was intended to include disorders of sex development (such as 
ambiguous genitalia or a mismatch in anatomic parts), it is not clear that this is all the carve-out 
was intended to include. By its terms, the safe harbor also applies to gender identity disorders that 
were once believed to be “purely” mental disorders but are now believed to have physical (i.e., 
genetic and/or biological) roots. See id. at 5 (“In light of the evolving scientific evidence suggest-
ing that gender dysphoria may have a physical basis . . . the GID Exclusion should be construed 
narrowly such that gender dysphoria falls outside its scope.”); see also Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. 
Rptr. 278, 282 n.6 (Super. Ct. 2001) (“In light of the remarkable growth in our understanding of 
the role of genetics in producing what were previously thought to be psychological disorders, this 
Court cannot eliminate the possibility that all or some gender identity disorders result ‘from physi-
cal impairments’ in an individual’s genome.”); Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-71 to 16-78 (discussing 
physical-impairment safe harbor). 
 201 42 U.S.C. § 12211; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 88 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
1990 WL 121679 (discussing impairments excluded from ADA). 
 202 H.R. REP. NO. 102-973, at 158 (1992) (Conf. Rep.), available at 1992 WL 322488. 
 203 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-44 to 16-48 & n.191 (discussing and citing cases). In the 
handful of cases discussing these exclusions, courts have invoked the exclusions without analysis 
and held against the transgender plaintiff. See, e.g., James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., No. 94-
2235-KHV, 1994 WL 731517, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994) (dismissing ADA claim of 
transgender employee); see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. 
Ohio 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., 
No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (same); accord Michaels 
v. Akal Sec., No. 09-cv-1300, 2010 WL 2573988, at *6–7 (D. Colo. June 24, 2010) (holding that 
the transgender plaintiff could not bring a claim under the Rehabilitation Act because of the exclu-
sions). In its most recent published decision addressing a disability discrimination claim brought 
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addressed the constitutionality of any federal statute that facially discrimi-
nates against transgender people.204 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. is the first 
to do so, and it surely will not be the last.205 This Part details the equal pro-
tection analysis deployed in Blatt that should inevitably invalidate the 
ADA’s transgender exclusions as well as other laws that single out 
transgender people for disparate treatment.206 Section A provides an over-
view of equal protection in general and the various tiers of scrutiny—strict, 
intermediate and rational basis—involved.207 Section B explains why the 
ADA’s exclusion of transvestism, transsexualism, and GID is, in fact, a 
transgender classification.208 Section C then analyzes what level of scrutiny 
transgender classifications require.209 Finally, section D explains why these 
transgender classifications violate equal protection.210  
A. Equal Protection Generally 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits states 
from “deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”211 Stated another way, “[A]ll persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.”212 The Fifth Amendment impresses the same 
obligation on the federal government.213 The determination of whether a 
governmental classification is found to violate equal protection typically 
depends on what level of scrutiny—“strict,” “intermediate,” or “rational 
basis”—the court applies to the classification at issue.214 The level of scru-
                                                                                                                           
by a transgender employee, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) likewise 
relied on the Rehabilitation Act’s transgender exclusions, and EEOC regulations mirroring these 
exclusions, to dismiss the employee’s claim. Bell v. Shalala, E.E.O.C. Doc. No. 01941146, 1994 
WL 1755505, at *3 (Sept. 9, 1994), abrogated by Macy v. Holder, E.E.O.C. Doc. No. 
0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
 204 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing other challenges, but identifying Ms. 
Blatt’s case as the first to challenge a federal statute that facially discriminates against transgender 
people). 
 205 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL (E.D. Pa. argued Dec. 9, 2015); see 
also supra notes 15–34 and accompanying text (discussing the Blatt case). 
 206 See infra notes 203–461 and accompanying text. 
 207 See infra notes 211–266 and accompanying text. 
 208 See infra notes 267–276 and accompanying text. 
 209 See infra notes 277–437 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 438–461 and accompanying text. 
 211 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 212 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 213 See Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (noting that a Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection analysis is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 214 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 551 (4th ed. 
2011) (discussing tiers of scrutiny). 
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tiny, in turn, depends on the type of classification.215 While an extensive 
review of the Supreme Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny analysis is beyond the scope 
of this Article, some introductory points are instructive. 
1. Heightened Scrutiny: Strict and Intermediate 
Classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin are consid-
ered “suspect” classifications and therefore receive “strict” scrutiny.216 This 
means that the classification violates equal protection unless the govern-
ment can show that the classification is “narrowly tailored to further a com-
pelling governmental interest.”217 Classifications based on sex and illegiti-
macy of birth are considered “quasi-suspect” classifications and receive 
intermediate scrutiny.218 This means that the classification violates equal 
protection unless the government can show that the classification is “sub-
stantially related to the achievement” of “important governmental objec-
tives.”219 Given the burden of the government’s proof, classifications sub-
ject to strict or intermediate scrutiny—collectively, “heightened scrutiny”—
are generally held unconstitutional.220 All other classifications are subject to 
what is known as “rational basis review,” unless the challenger can per-
suade a court that the classification warrants heightened scrutiny.221  
The Supreme Court has identified a series of four factors for determin-
ing whether a classification warrants heightened scrutiny: (1) the lack of 
relevance of the characteristic upon which the classification is based; (2) a 
history of discrimination against those with the characteristic; (3) the immu-
tability of the characteristic; and (4) the minority status or political power-
lessness of those with the characteristic.222 These factors, and their place in 
the Court’s three-tiered equal protection hierarchy, have been much ma-
                                                                                                                           
 215 Id. at 553–54. 
 216 Id. at 554. 
 217 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). 
 218 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 553. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 553–54. 
 221 Id. at 688–89. 
 222 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (ana-
lyzing factors and concluding that classifications based on sex are subject to heightened scrutiny); 
Windsor v. United States (Windsor I), 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (identifying factors 
and concluding that classifications based on homosexuality warrant heightened scrutiny), aff’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (declining to decide whether classifications based on homosexuality 
should be given heightened scrutiny but finding that DOMA violated equal protection principles); 
see also ROBERT C. FARRELL & ALISON E. CONROY, EQUAL PROTECTION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 169–74 (2013) (discussing factors). 
2016] Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause 543 
ligned by Supreme Court Justices and commentators alike.223 Notwithstand-
ing legitimate criticisms, the four-factor test determines the level of scrutiny 
a court will apply and is therefore generally dispositive of whether a classi-
fication will stand or fall. 
2. Rational Basis Review: Deferential and Demanding 
For those classifications that do not merit heightened scrutiny, the bur-
den is on the challenger of the law to show that the classification is not “ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose.”224 To complicate mat-
ters, the Supreme Court has employed two distinct varieties of rational basis 
review—one deferential, the other considerably more demanding.225 
Deferential review is, as its name suggests, “usually tantamount to no 
review at all.”226 Simply put, the government classification is upheld—
every time. This is because courts applying the deferential rational basis 
review to a statute need not ascertain its actual purpose. Instead, a court 
will “hypothesize the purpose of a law” or rely on post hoc rationalization 
by government attorneys defending the law—“even in the face of strong 
evidence to the contrary.”227 Furthermore, courts applying deferential ra-
tional basis review do not require an actual correlation between the classifi-
cation and the (real or hypothesized) purpose.228 So long as the governmen-
tal decisionmaker could have reasonably believed that the classification 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 555 (discussing criticisms of levels of scrutiny); 
see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing standards 
of review as applied to equal protection claims); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 
S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 546 (2004) (discussing problems with three-tiered framework); Marcy 
Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138 (2011) (same). As 
EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum has colorfully remarked: 
[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the “classification” prong of equal pro-
tection bears the mark of case-by-case adjudication, not the mark of a coherently 
developed theory applied uniformly and systematically to all comers . . . . Essential-
ly, advocates [arguing for heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause] 
are required to dance in a room where a nine-person, three-tiered analysis orchestra 
is playing. The fact that this may be a less than optimal room in which to dance, be-
cause the orchestra’s musical instruments contain distorted acoustic qualities that 
skew the notes from the start, is really just too bad for the dancers. 
Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 237, 247 n.30 (1996). 
 224 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 688. 
 225 See FARRELL & CONROY, supra note 222, at 29. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 12; see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (ending inquiry 
where there are “plausible reasons for Congress’ action”). 
 228 See FARRELL & CONROY, supra note 222, at 22 (discussing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981)). 
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would serve the (real or hypothesized) purpose, courts will find the law ra-
tionally related to that purpose—even if the decisionmaker was mistaken in 
its belief and the law does not, in fact, serve such purpose.229 
By contrast, under the demanding version of rational basis review, the 
Court insists on evidence of an actual—not hypothetical—legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, and a correlation in fact between the challenged classifi-
cation and such purpose.230 As noted by many commentators, the Court’s 
application of demanding over deferential rational basis review lacks coher-
ence.231 The nature of the disadvantaged class, the significance of the depri-
vation at issue, the internal logic of the Court’s analysis of means (“rational 
relationship”) and ends (“legitimate government purpose”), and even the 
shifting majorities on the Court do not provide a unifying principle.232 
The most that can be said of the extraordinarily few cases employing 
demanding rational basis is this: animus matters.233 Virtually every law dis-
advantages some people incidentally.234 But when it appears that the very 
goal of the legislature is to adversely impact a class—that is, disadvantage 
for disadvantage’s sake—its impartiality is “suspect”235 and requires “care-
ful consideration.”236 As the Court famously stated in 1973, in U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, and as it has reiterated on multiple occa-
sions since that time, “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”237 In short, evi-
                                                                                                                           
 229 See id. 
 230 Id. at 29. 
 231 See id. at 43–45 (discussing the problems with demanding versus deferential rational basis 
review); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (“To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and per-
haps the method employed must hereafter be called ‘second order’ rational-basis review rather 
than “heightened scrutiny.”). 
 232 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 411 (1999) (attempting to identify a “pre-
dictable pattern” in Supreme Court’s application of demanding rational basis analysis). 
 233 See Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 892 (stating that a showing of animus “is virtually the only 
way a plaintiff is successful” under rational basis review). 
 234 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (discussing 
“incidental disadvantages” that laws “impose on certain persons”). 
 235 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 236 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979) (“[Discriminatory purpose] implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.”). 
 237 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 
‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’” (quoting Romer, 517 
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dence of animus can trigger demanding rational basis review. Once trig-
gered, animus is an evidentiary trump card that discredits other “legitimate” 
governmental interests as pretextual.238 
Evidence of animus can be either direct or indirect. A small but grow-
ing handful of Supreme Court cases—particularly those in the sexual orien-
tation context—makes the point. In Moreno, the Court invalidated an 
amendment to a federal statute that deprived food stamps to poor house-
holds containing one or more unrelated persons.239 Of significance to the 
Court’s holding was direct evidence of animus—legislative history suggest-
ing that the actual purpose of the law was not fraud prevention but was in-
stead “to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participat-
ing in the food stamp program,” which the Court deemed an illegitimate 
governmental interest.240 In 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, the Court invalidated a local zoning ordinance that required a spe-
cial use permit for group homes housing people with intellectual disabilities 
but required no permit for other multi-person dwellings.241 Like Moreno, 
the Court’s decision in Cleburne rested, in part, on direct evidence of ani-
mus.242 According to the Court, the zoning ordinance was invalid because it 
appeared from the record of the City Council proceedings “to rest on an 
irrational prejudice” against people with intellectual disabilities.243  
Direct evidence of animus (for example, in the statute’s text or legisla-
tive history) is not required to trigger demanding rational basis review. The 
Court has inferred animus from the structure and practical effect of the chal-
lenged law.244 In 1996, in Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated a state con-
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 633)); see also infra notes 239–266 and accompanying text (discussing Moreno, Cleburne, 
Romer, Windsor II, and Obergefell). 
 238 See Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 889, 904 (discussing the importance of animus in equal 
protection jurisprudence); see also Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
151, 173 (2016) (“Under animus review, the Court tends to proceed directly from detecting a 
whiff of animus to declaring such hate-based laws invalid, with little discernible analysis of the 
state’s interests.”); Goldberg, supra note 223, at 545 (“Whether characterized as ‘animosity,’ 
‘mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable [in the 
relevant context],’ or ‘irrational prejudice,’ the Court has firmly singled out a set of government 
interests that are illegitimate and, thus, impermissible, even under the most lenient review.”). 
 239 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538. 
 240 Id. at 534. 
 241 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447–48, 450. 
 242 Id. at 446–47; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538. 
 243 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. Specifically, the Court noted “the negative attitude of the ma-
jority of property owners” and “[unsubstantiated] fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood” 
regarding people with intellectual disabilities. Id. at 448. 
 244 See Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 911 (stating that “plaintiffs can prove that a challenged law 
is based in unconstitutional animus . . . by pointing to direct evidence of private bias in the legisla-
tive record, or by supporting an inference of animus based on the structure of a law”). 
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stitutional amendment that prohibited all existing and future antidiscrimina-
tion laws protecting lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, while leaving all oth-
er antidiscrimination laws intact.245 According to the Court, the amend-
ment’s imposition of such broad burdens (i.e., nullifying a vast array of le-
gal protections) on such a narrow group of people (lesbian, gay, and bisexu-
al people), without sufficient factual context for the relationship between 
the classification and the legitimate purpose it purportedly served, was so 
“exceptional,” “unprecedented,” “unusual,” “rare,” and “far-reaching” that 
it appeared to have been “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law”—an illegitimate purpose.246 Reiterating More-
no’s repudiation of laws motivated by “a bare . . . desire to harm,” the Court 
determined that the “sheer breadth” of Colorado’s amendment was “inex-
plicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”247 This infer-
ence of animus was also supported by the law’s practical effect: “immedi-
ate, continuing, and real injuries” to a class of people deemed “unequal to 
everyone else.”248 The Colorado amendment, the Court concluded, was “a 
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal 
Protection Clause does not permit.”249 
In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a state law that 
criminalized same-sex intimacy.250 Although decided under the Due Pro-
cess Clause’s substantive guarantee of liberty, Lawrence sounded in equal 
protection.251 The purpose of the statute was clearly to express moral disap-
proval of same-sex intimacy, and the practical effect of the statute was 
equally clear: to “demean the lives of homosexual persons,” thus stigmatiz-
                                                                                                                           
 245 517 U.S. at 629–30, 635–36; see Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of 
Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Second-
ary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 300–01 (2009) (discussing the Court’s application of rational 
basis review in Romer and Moreno).  
 246 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33, 635 (“A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult 
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of 
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”). 
 247 Id. at 634–35 (discussing “the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born 
of animosity toward the class of persons affected”); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.  
 248 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. Although “there was ample direct evidence of animus” against 
gay and lesbian people, “the Court could not invoke this evidence” because Bowers v. Hardwick, 
which upheld the constitutionality of laws criminalizing sodomy, was still good law at the time 
that Romer was decided. Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 928 (emphasis added); see also Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 249 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
 250 539 U.S at 562. 
 251 Id. at 578; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“Although Law-
rence elaborated its holding under the Due Process Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to reme-
dy, the continuing inequality that resulted from laws making intimacy in the lives of gays and 
lesbians a crime against the State.”). 
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ing them.252 Such a statute, the Court held, “furthers no legitimate state in-
terest.”253 
In 2013, in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated 
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which excluded 
same-sex marriages from the definition of “marriage” under federal law.254 
Invoking Moreno and Romer, the Court easily found a “bare desire to harm” 
in DOMA’s structure and practical effect, as well as in its text and legisla-
tive history.255 With respect to structure, the Court stated that “DOMA’s un-
usual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state 
definitions of marriage” was “strong evidence” of a law motivated by “im-
proper animus or purpose.”256 Like the amendment at issue in Romer, DO-
MA was at once too narrow and too broad; it singled out a “subset of state-
sanctioned marriages” and deprived them of the protection of more than a 
thousand laws.257 
Further supporting an inference of animus was the law’s practical ef-
fect: “to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all 
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned au-
thority of the States.”258 Echoing Romer’s repudiation of an amendment that 
inflicted injury on gay and lesbian people by making them “unequal to eve-
ryone else,” the Court stated that DOMA codifies inequality, and “demeans” 
not only same-sex couples but also their children.259 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575, 577 (discussing law’s imposition of stigma and suggesting that 
law was motivated by governing majority’s view that same-sex intimacy was “immoral”). 
 253 Id. at 578. 
 254 Windsor II, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. The Court invalidated DOMA under both the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and the Due Process Clause, utilizing the same reasoning. Compare id. (“DOMA is 
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution.”), with id. (stating that DOMA violates “the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” as incorporated in the Fifth Amendment). 
 255 Id. at 2693. The Supreme Court resisted the Second Circuit’s invitation to apply height-
ened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, but the Court reached the same result 
as the Second Circuit by applying demanding rational basis. See id. 
 256 Id. (emphasis added). 
 257 Id. at 2694. 
 258 Id. at 2693. 
 259 Id. at 2694, 2696. 
DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code. . . . [It] tells those 
[same-sex] couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are un-
worthy of federal recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable position 
of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple . . . [and] 
humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. . . . 
[It] instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex cou-
ples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the 
marriages of others. 
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In addition to the inference of animus created by DOMA’s structure 
and practical effect was the direct evidence of animus in DOMA’s legisla-
tive history and text. According to the House Report on DOMA, the pur-
pose of the law was to express “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, 
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”260 DOMA’s text was equally plain. 
The “stated purpose of the law was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the 
traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage 
laws’”—a purpose confirmed by the very title of the law: the Defense of 
Marriage Act.261 According to the Court, “The history of DOMA’s enact-
ment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity 
of same-sex marriages . . . was more than an incidental effect of the federal 
statute. It was its essence.”262 
In 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court invalidated state laws pro-
hibiting the licensing of same-sex marriages and recognition of same-sex 
marriages performed out-of-state on grounds that such laws violated gay 
and lesbian couples’ fundamental right to marry under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.263 Although Obergefell involved the deprivation 
of a fundamental right, a finding that would normally call for heightened 
scrutiny, the Court did not explicitly invoke heightened scrutiny.264 Instead, 
the Court held that the state laws barring recognition of same-sex marriages 
violated equal protection based on indirect evidence of moral animus.265 
This evidence included a “history of disapproval” of same-sex relationships, 
and the practical effect of such laws: “a grave and continuing harm on gays 
and lesbians, which serves to ‘disrespect and subordinate them.’”266  
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 2694–96 (citations omitted). 
 260 Id. at 2693; see also ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 109, at 316–18 (discussing state-
ments in DOMA’s legislative history opposing same-sex marriage on moral grounds). 
Representative Robert Barr . . . [stated] that the “flames of hedonism, the flames of 
narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundation of 
our society: the family unit.” Representative Tom Coburn supported DOMA be-
cause his constituents felt “homosexuals” are “immoral” and “promiscuous.” The is-
sue, he said, “is not diversity”—the issue is “perversity.” 
ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 109, at 318 (citation omitted)). 
 261 Windsor II, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 264 See id. (declining to explicitly discuss heightened scrutiny); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 214, at 812 (discussing fundamental rights and the application of strict scrutiny to such 
rights). 
 265 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 266 Id. The Court’s due process analysis reiterated this theme of harm. Id. at 2602, 2606–07 
(referring repeatedly to the “hurt,” “stigma and injury,” “dignitary wounds,” “pain and humilia-
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B. The ADA’s Exclusion of Transvestism, Transsexualism, and GID Is a 
Transgender Classification 
Before analyzing what level of scrutiny to apply to the ADA’s 
transgender exclusions, it is first necessary to explain why these exclusions 
are, in fact, a transgender classification.267 The ADA does not explicitly ex-
clude “transgender” people. The ADA excludes people with GID, transsex-
ualism, and transvestism.268 One might argue that the ADA exclusions are 
therefore not a “transgender” classification at all, but merely a classification 
of various medical impairments. This contention overlooks realities. 
“Transgender” is an umbrella term that describes those whose gender 
identity does not conform to their assigned sex at birth.269 Because the de-
fining feature of GID, transsexualism, and transvestism is nonconformity 
between gender identity and assigned sex at birth, everyone with these con-
ditions is necessarily “transgender.”270 Furthermore, because the ADA ex-
cludes not only those with these conditions, but also those who once had 
these conditions and all those perceived by others as having these condi-
tions, the ADA in fact excludes a broad swath of the transgender communi-
ty that does not have any of these conditions.271 The fallacy of a contrary 
conclusion is easily apparent. To say that the ADA’s exclusion of transves-
tism, transsexualism, and GID does not exclude transgender people as a 
class would be like saying that the exclusion of sickle cell anemia does not 
exclude African-American people or that an exclusion for Gaucher’s Dis-
ease does not exclude Jews.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, which invalidated laws 
that criminalized same-sex intimacy, is also instructive.272 In that case, a 
majority of the Court implicitly rejected the state’s attempt to draw a dis-
tinction between laws that burden classes of people (lesbian and gay peo-
ple) and those that burden some other characteristic that is closely correlat-
ed with that group (sexual activity between people of the same sex).273 Jus-
                                                                                                                           
tion,” and demeaning and disparaging treatment suffered by same-sex couples and their children, 
as well as the lack of any “risk of harm to [same-sex couples] or third parties”). 
 267 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 686 (noting that an “equal protection analysis al-
ways must begin by identifying how the government is distinguishing among people”). 
 268 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2012). 
 269 See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 458 (defining “transgender”); see also supra note 42 and 
accompanying text (discussing the term “transgender person”). 
 270 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the term “transgender person”). 
 271 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012) (covering those with a “record of” and “regarded as having” 
a disability). 
 272 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
 273 See id. at 574 (stating that laws criminalizing sodomy denied homosexual couples the right 
to make intimate and personal choices about their lives “just as heterosexual persons do”). 
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tice O’Connor went one step further in her concurring opinion, explicitly 
stating that “homosexual conduct ‘is closely correlated with being homo-
sexual’” and therefore, “one could not escape the fact that the law was ‘di-
rected toward gay persons as a class.’”274 The same is true here; the classifi-
cation of medical conditions “closely correlated” with transgender people 
plainly is the classification of transgender people.275 
Moreover, if there were any doubt as to the nature of the classification, 
it bears noting that the ADA does not simply exclude three medical condi-
tions in the DSM associated with transgender people; it excludes the only 
three medical conditions in the DSM closely associated with transgender 
people.276 Congress’s exclusion of all three DSM conditions associated with 
transgender people proves definitively that the ADA exclusions are a 
transgender classification. 
C. What Level of Scrutiny for Transgender Classifications? 
Having determined that the ADA’s exclusion of GID, transvestism, and 
transsexualism is a transgender classification, the next issue is what level of 
scrutiny to apply to the classification: “strict,” “intermediate,” or “rational 
basis.”277 This section provides three alternatives. Subsection 1 proposes 
applying heightened scrutiny to transgender classifications because 
transgender people are a suspect/quasi-suspect class under the Supreme 
Court’s four-factor test.278 Subsection 2 proposes applying heightened scru-
tiny to transgender classifications because such classifications are necessari-
ly based on sex.279 Subsection 3 argues that such classifications fail even 
under rational basis review, because they are based on a bare desire to 
harm.280 
                                                                                                                           
 274 Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 924 (stating that 
“[b]oth the majority opinion (implicitly) and the concurrence (explicitly) in Lawrence recognized 
the principle that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct in fact criminalized homosexual identi-
ty”). 
 275 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that laws targeting ho-
mosexual conduct target homosexuals as a class). 
 276 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-153 to 16-158 (listing transgender-associated diagnoses). 
 277 See supra notes 211–266 and accompanying text (providing background on levels of scru-
tiny). 
 278 See infra notes 281–398 and accompanying text. 
 279 See infra notes 399–435 and accompanying text. 
 280 See infra notes 436–437 and accompanying text. 
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1. A New Suspect/Quasi-Suspect Class: Heightened Scrutiny Based on 
Transgender Status 
The Supreme Court has determined that classifications based on race, 
national origin, alienage, sex, and illegitimacy receive heightened scruti-
ny.281 For nearly thirty years, the Court has been unwilling to subject other 
classifications to such scrutiny.282 Lower federal courts and state courts, 
however, have not shared the Court’s reluctance, holding that classifications 
based on sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny.283 The De-
partment of Justice has likewise concluded that, “given a number of factors, 
including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on 
sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.”284 
This subsection argues that transgender classifications warrant heightened 
scrutiny because transgender people are a suspect/quasi-suspect class, based 
on the Supreme Court’s four-factor test: transgender people have suffered a 
history of discrimination, they have the ability to participate in and contrib-
ute to society, they exhibit immutable distinguishing characteristics, and 
they are a minority and lack political power.285 At least one federal district 
court—in the 2015 case of Adkins v. City of New York—has determined that 
transgender people are a quasi-suspect class based on these four factors.286 
It is highly likely that other courts will follow suit. 
a. Transgender Individuals Have Suffered a History of Discrimination 
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently observed, “the 
hostility and discrimination that transgender individuals face in our society 
today is well-documented.”287 Transgender people are disproportionately at 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See supra notes 216–223 and accompanying text (discussing classifications that receive 
heightened scrutiny). 
 282 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 688; see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–62 (1988) 
(adopting intermediate scrutiny standard for non-marital children). 
 283 FARRELL & CONROY, supra note 222, at 3. 
 284 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives, regarding the Defense of Marriage Act 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [https://perma.
cc/V34B-ZZ3T] [hereinafter 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter]. 
 285 See id. (concluding that classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny based on a four-factor test). 
 286 Adkins v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-7519, 2015 WL 7076956, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
16, 2015) (holding that “transgender people are a quasi-suspect class” entitled to heightened scru-
tiny under the Supreme Court’s four-factor test, and denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plain-
tiff’s claim that police targeted her because she was transgender). 
 287 Brocksmith v. United States, 99 A.3d 690, 698 (D.C. 2014); see also Adkins, 2015 WL 
7076956, at *3 (stating that “this history of persecution and discrimination [against transgender 
people] is not yet history”). 
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risk for discrimination in almost all aspects of life, including employment, 
housing, education, public accommodations, and access to government ser-
vices.288 Experiences of employment discrimination, in particular, are near-
ly universal for transgender individuals. According to The National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey Report (“National Survey”), the most 
extensive survey of transgender discrimination ever taken, 97% of nearly 
6500 respondents experienced harassment or mistreatment on the job or 
took actions like hiding their gender transition to avoid such treatment, and 
47% of respondents lost their jobs, were denied a promotion, or were denied 
a job as result of being transgender.289 In fact, survey respondents experi-
enced unemployment at twice the rate of the general population, with rates 
up to four times higher for transgender people of color.290 
These barriers to employment contribute to tremendous economic in-
security; respondents were four times more likely than the general popula-
tion to have a household income of less than $10,000 per year, and 16% of 
respondents were compelled to work in the underground economy, such as 
sex work or selling drugs.291 A report by the Williams Institute at UCLA 
School of Law, which summarized six studies of transgender employment 
discrimination conducted between 1996 and 2006, similarly revealed that as 
high as 60% of transgender respondents reported being unemployed and as 
high as 64% earned incomes less than $25,000 per year.292 
Given these employment barriers, it is not surprising that transgender 
individuals also face significant housing instability. According to the Na-
tional Survey, 19% of respondents had been homeless at some point in their 
lives (2.5 times the rate of the national population) and almost 2% of re-
spondents were currently homeless (nearly twice the percentage of the na-
tional population).293 For those who had attempted to access homeless shel-
ters, 29% were turned away altogether because they were transgender, 42% 
                                                                                                                           
 288 See generally JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & 
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASKFORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3–8 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/
downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EHB-RTEM] [hereinafter NATIONAL 
SURVEY] (providing summary of discrimination against transgender people in various aspects of 
life). 
 289 See id. at 53 (providing statistics regarding employment discrimination). 
 290 Id. at 3. 
 291 Id. at 22. 
 292 BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 14 (2011), https://multco.us/
file/15673/download [https://perma.cc/5D2Y-VRRT]. 
 293 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 288, at 4. 
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were forced to stay in facilities designated for the wrong gender, and 55% 
experienced harassment, including physical and sexual assault.294 
Education is another area in which transgender people experience sig-
nificant discrimination. Transgender individuals in grades K–12 frequently 
experience harassment (78%), physical assault (35%), and sexual assault 
(12%) by students as well as by teachers and staff.295 In fact, 15% of re-
spondents in K–12 and higher education left school altogether because of 
such harassment.296 Nineteen percent of respondents in higher education 
were denied access to gender-appropriate housing.297 
In places of public accommodation, transgender individuals frequently 
experience discrimination—from outright denial of services (44%) to verbal 
harassment (53%) and physical assault (8%).298 For example, in doctor’s 
offices, hospitals, emergency rooms, and mental health clinics, 28% of re-
spondents experienced harassment and 19% were denied services altogeth-
er. In retail stores, discrimination was even worse, with 37% of respondents 
reporting harassment and 32% reporting denial of services.299 Twenty-two 
percent of respondents reported verbal harassment and 4% were physically 
attacked on buses, trains, and taxis.300 
Because transgender individuals are more likely to be the victims of 
violent crime, to be on the street due to homelessness, or to work in the un-
derground economy, they are also more likely to interact with police.301 
These interactions often involve discrimination. For example, 22% of re-
spondents reported harassment by police, including being profiled as sex 
workers and arrested (a practice known colloquially as “Walking While 
Transgender”), and 20% reported being denied services by the police.302 Six 
percent of respondents reported being physically assaulted by police, and 
2% reported being sexually assaulted by police; for transgender people of 
color, these numbers more than double to 15% and 7%, respectively.303 Not 
surprisingly, this discrimination has a chilling effect, with 46% of respond-
ents reporting being uncomfortable seeking police assistance.304 Incarcer-
                                                                                                                           
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 33. 
 296 Id. at 40. 
 297 Id. at 39. 
 298 Id. at 124. 
 299 Id. at 72. 
 300 Id. at 130. 
 301 Id. at 158. 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. at 160. 
 304 Id. at 162; see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 11 (2009) (finding that “transgender people 
frequently distrust law enforcement authorities, and the police often lack training and familiarity 
with transgender people”). 
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ated transgender individuals also experience discrimination in the form of 
harassment by correctional officers (37%) and other inmates (35%),305 
physical and sexual assault (16% and 15%, respectively),306 and even the 
denial of routine health care (12%).307 
Discrimination jeopardizes not only transgender rights, but also 
transgender health and, quite literally, transgender lives. As the APA has 
concluded, “discrimination and lack of equal civil rights is damaging to the 
mental health of transgender and gender variant individuals.”308 The DSM 
agrees that for transgender people, “high levels of stigmatization, discrimi-
nation, and victimization” can “lead[] to negative self-concept, increased 
rates of mental disorder comorbidity, school dropout, and economic mar-
ginalization, including unemployment, with attendant social and mental 
health risks, especially in individuals from resource-poor family back-
grounds.”309 Indeed, such discrimination can also lead to death. According 
to the National Survey, 41% of respondents reported attempting suicide 
compared to just 1.6% of the general population.310 These numbers are con-
sistent with those of another study reported by the APA, which found that 
“gender-based discrimination and victimization were found to be inde-
pendently associated with attempted suicide in a population of transgender 
individuals, 32% of whom had histories of trying to kill themselves.”311 
These statistics reveal perhaps the most troubling truth about discrimina-
tion’s toll on the lives of transgender people: many contemplate death over 
living in a society that persistently discriminates against them. 
The animus leveled at transgender individuals often extends beyond 
discrimination, culminating in horrific hate crimes. In 2014, the National 
Council of Anti-Violence Programs reported the hate-motivated murder of 
eighteen members of the LGBT community in the prior year.312 Thirteen of 
those murdered were transgender individuals, all but one of whom was a 
transgender woman of color.313 These numbers continue a three-year trend 
in which transgender women—and transgender people of color, in particu-
lar—experienced a greater risk of homicide than others in the LGBT com-
                                                                                                                           
 305 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 288, at 166. 
 306 Id. at 167. 
 307 Id. at 169. 
 308 APA POSITION STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10. 
 309 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 458. 
 310 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 288, at 82. 
 311 APA POSITION STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10. 
 312 NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, 
QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED HATE VIOLENCE IN 2013, at 8, 22–23 (2014), http://avp.org/storage/
documents/2013_ncavp_hvreport_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MLF-XGX5]. 
 313 Id. 
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munity.314 Due to the compelling need for protections for transgender peo-
ple against hate violence, Congress passed and President Obama signed into 
law the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
of 2009, which extended federal protections against crimes based on gender, 
disability, gender identity or sexual orientation.315 In passing this law, the 
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee emphasized the “particular-
ly violent” nature of hate crimes against transgender people and the “ex-
treme bias against gender nonconformity.”316 
Importantly, transgender people have endured pervasive discrimination 
for well over a century. In Windsor, the Second Circuit concluded that les-
bians and gay people had experienced a history of discrimination for at least 
ninety years.317 According to the court, the fact that for many years homo-
sexual conduct was a criminal act in many states provided “the most telling 
proof of animus and discrimination against homosexuals in this country.”318 
The same is true with transgender expression: beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century and continuing through much of the twentieth century, 
such expression was explicitly prohibited by state and local laws that crimi-
nalized cross-dressing.319 Add to this the fact that, for much of this coun-
try’s history, transgender people have been regarded as a subset of the gay 
                                                                                                                           
 314 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 11 (stating that advocacy groups reported the murder of over 
400 people due to anti-transgender bias since 1999, and that “[i]n 2008 alone, there were 21 mur-
ders of transgender and gender non-conforming people”). 
 315 See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
 316 H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 11. As the authors of the National Survey have observed: 
It is part of social and legal convention in the United States to discriminate against, 
ridicule, and abuse transgender and gender non-conforming people within founda-
tional institutions such as the family, schools, the workplace and health care settings, 
every day. Instead of recognizing that the moral failure lies in society’s unwilling-
ness to embrace different gender identities and expression, society blames 
transgender and gender nonconforming people for bringing the discrimination and 
violence on themselves. 
NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 288, at 8. 
 317 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 182. As Attorney General Eric Holder stated in his letter notifying 
Congress of the Department of Justice’s refusal to defend DOMA, “there is, regrettably, a signifi-
cant history of purposeful discrimination against gay and lesbian people, by governmental as well 
as private entities, based on prejudice and stereotypes that continue to have ramifications today.” 
2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 2. 
 318 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 182; see also 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 2 (citing 
Lawrence and noting that states historically demeaned gays and lesbians by criminalizing their 
private sexual conduct). 
 319 See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 171 (2010) (discussing laws criminalizing cross-dressing); see also 
supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text (same). 
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and lesbian community, and it becomes clear that transgender people have 
endured the same discrimination as gays and lesbians.320  
Indeed, one could reasonably argue that transgender people have suf-
fered more than gays and lesbians.321 While “homophobia and transphobia 
are tightly intertwined,”322 the greatest scorn has been reserved for those 
widely regarded as the “the most subversive” segment of the LGBT com-
munity: transgender people.323 As the Connecticut Supreme Court said of 
gay and lesbian people in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 
transgender people “are hated, quite irrationally, for what they are.”324 The 
“bigotry and hatred” that transgender people have faced “are akin to, and, in 
certain respects, perhaps even more severe than, those confronted by some 
groups that have been accorded heightened judicial protection.”325 
This historical discrimination against transgender people is perhaps 
best epitomized by Congress’s explicit exclusion of transgender people 
from four federal civil rights laws over the past thirty years. In 1988, Con-
gress excluded “transvestites” from the Fair Housing Act.326 In 1990, Con-
                                                                                                                           
 320 Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-133 (noting that transgender people have been considered “a 
subset of the gay and lesbian community,” and “have suffered the same fate as gays and lesbi-
ans”). 
 321 Minter, supra note 4, at 142. 
Gender nonconforming people consistently have been among the most visible and 
vulnerable members of gay communities—among the most likely to be beaten, 
raped, and killed; among the most likely to be criminalized and labeled deviant; 
among the most likely to end up in psychiatric hospitals and prisons; among the 
most likely to be denied housing, employment, and medical care; among the most 
likely to be rejected and harassed as young people; and among the most likely to be 
separated from their own children. 
Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-133 (discussing historical discrimination against 
transgender people). While some may argue that such scorn has ancient roots, the treatment of 
transgender people over the whole of human history points in the opposite direction. Compare 
People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (Crim. Ct. 1974) (“Western civilization has long ab-
horred transvestism.”), with Minter, supra note 4, at 171 (“From prehistoric times to the present, 
individuals whom today we might call transgender[] and transsexual have played prominent roles 
in many societies, including our own.”). In short, while animus toward transgender people has 
existed for quite some time, respect for transgender people is a tradition far more deeply rooted. 
Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (stating that “historical grounds relied upon [by the Supreme Court] 
in Bowers” for upholding sodomy laws “are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstat-
ed”). 
 324 See 957 A.2d 407, 446 (Conn. 2008) (discussing the irrational nature of the prejudice di-
rected at lesbian and gay people, “who are ridiculed, ostracized, despised, demonized and con-
demned merely for being who they are”). 
 325 See id. 
 326 See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (discussing transgender exclusion from 
the Fair Housing Act). 
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gress excluded GID, transsexualism, and transvestism from the ADA.327 
The following year, Congress added an identical exclusion to the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, thereby stripping transgender people of civil rights pro-
tections they had enjoyed for nearly twenty years.328 And in 2008, Congress 
passed the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), which maintained the 
transgender exclusions while expanding the definition of disability under 
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for all other impairments.329 By explicitly 
excluding transgender people from these civil rights protections, Congress 
expressly sanctioned blatant discrimination against transgender people, cod-
ifying their unequal status in law. 
The discrimination inherent in these transgender exclusions is com-
pounded by the callous way in which the ADA and Rehabilitation Act ex-
cludes transgender people. First, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act group 
GID, transsexualism, and transvestism together with a variety of other men-
tal conditions widely regarded as being immoral.330 By singling out only 
these conditions for exclusion, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act brand 
transgender people as morally unfit for civil rights.331 In so doing, these 
laws both reflect and perpetuate the very problems they seek to dismantle: 
“the prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others” and the “inferior status” 
that people with disabilities occupy in our society.332 
Second, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act classify GID and transsexual-
ism as “sexual behavior disorders” despite the fact that the medical com-
munity has never classified them as such.333 This crass coupling likewise 
reflects the disdain of lawmakers who believed that all transgender people 
must necessarily have a sexual disorder.334 Lastly, and more subtly, the 
                                                                                                                           
 327 See supra notes 138–201 and accompanying text (discussing transgender exclusion from 
the ADA). 
 328 See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing transgender exclusion from the 
Rehabilitation Act). 
 329 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 330 See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
 331 See Barry, supra note 159, at 25 (stating that all “of the mental impairments actually ex-
cluded from the ADA have, in Senator Armstrong’s words, “‘a moral content to them’”). 
 332 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6); Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) 
(“Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment would be 
inconsistent with the basic purpose of [the statute], which is to ensure that handicapped individu-
als are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of 
others.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (finding that “society has tended to isolate and segre-
gate individuals with disabilities”). 
 333 See supra notes 194–199 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA’s misclassification 
of GID and transsexualism). 
 334 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-88 (discussing Congress’s misunderstanding that GID and 
transsexualism were sexual behavior disorders). 
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ADA excludes “transvestites” in two separate sections of the law, under-
scoring the legislators’ extreme desire to deny transgender people legal pro-
tection.335 In its rush to exclude anything and everything “transgender,” 
Congress excluded transvestism twice—the only medical condition to re-
ceive such a dubious distinction.336 
b. Transgender Individuals Have the Ability to Participate in and 
Contribute to Society 
In Windsor, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit conclud-
ed that “the aversion homosexuals experience has nothing to do with apti-
tude or performance.”337 The same can be said of the discrimination leveled 
at transgender people.338 The incongruence between a transgender person’s 
gender identity and assigned sex, like sexual orientation, race, national 
origin, and alienage, “bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society.”339 Although there are some characteristics, such as age and disabil-
ity, that “may arguably inhibit an individual’s ability to contribute to socie-
ty, at least in some respect,”340 transgender status is not one of them. As the 
Connecticut Supreme Court said of gay and lesbian people in Kerrigan, “in 
this critical respect,” transgender people “stand in stark contrast to other 
groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition, 
despite a history of discrimination.”341 
Importantly, “transgender” and “impairment” are not synonymous. 
Although some transgender people experience Gender Dysphoria—distress 
and discomfort with their assigned sex which, if left untreated, may limit 
their ability to work or engage in other life functions—many do not.342 In-
deed, many transgender people are completely comfortable living just the 
                                                                                                                           
 335 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing Amendments 717 and 722, which 
excluded “transvestites” and “transvestism,” respectively). 
 336 See Colker, supra note 129, at 33, 50 (stating that this “redundancy is itself derogatory 
because it highlights the legislators’ extreme desire to prevent this group from having legal protec-
tion”). 
 337 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 182–83. 
 338 Adkins, 2015 WL 7076956, at *3 (“[T]ransgender status bears no relation to ability to 
contribute to society. . . . [A] transgender person, simply by virtue of transgender status, is [not] 
any less productive than any other member of society.”). 
 339 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 182. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 435; see also 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 3 (“Re-
cent evolutions in legislation (including the pending repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell), in commu-
nity practices and attitudes, in case law (including the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lawrence and 
Romer), and in social science . . . make clear that sexual orientation is not a characteristic that 
generally bears on legitimate policy objectives.”). 
 342 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing gender dysphoria). 
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way they are.343 Stated another way, while everyone who experiences Gen-
der Dysphoria is necessarily transgender, not everyone who is transgender 
necessarily experiences Gender Dysphoria.344 The mere fact that some 
members of a suspect class may sometimes experience impairment does not 
diminish their status as a suspect class and the requisite scrutiny accorded 
such classifications. Accordingly, transgender individuals are perfectly able 
to participate in and contribute to society. 
Numerous cases, drawn principally from the employment context, con-
firm transgender people’s ability to participate and contribute. For example, 
in 2011, in the equal protection case of Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of a transgender employee with no job 
performance problems who was fired by her employer—over the recom-
mendation of her immediate supervisor—solely because she intended to 
undergo gender transition.345 And in 2002, in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio similarly rejected 
the City’s argument that a police officer’s status as a transgender person 
hindered the officer’s job performance as a sergeant, noting that a city-
mandated psychological evaluation during probation found the officer fit for 
duty.346 
c. Transgender Individuals Exhibit Immutable Distinguishing 
Characteristics 
“Immutability” literally means “cannot be changed,” but refers more 
broadly to “characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth,” not 
by “individual responsibility.”347 Immutability is an important consideration 
because it means the characteristic is outside of the person’s control, thus 
rendering the discrimination “more clearly unfair.”348 Simply put, heaping 
                                                                                                                           
 343 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 4. 
 344 See id. (discussing Gender Dysphoria). 
 345 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1292 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). Similarly, 
in 1986, in Blackwell v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia characterized the defendant’s refusal to hire a transgender employee as “highly reprehensible,” 
stating that the Department “knew plaintiff could do the job and had no sound basis for even re-
fusing to accept him for the job,” and fired the plaintiff simply “to avoid the inevitable administra-
tive hassle that would occur if [the Department] declined a qualified applicant.” 656 F. Supp. 713, 
714–15 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 346 No. C-1-00-780, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26207, at *30 (S.D. Ohio 2002), aff’d, 401 F.3d 
729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 347 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion); see also FARRELL & CONROY, supra note 
222, at 171 (discussing concept of immutability). 
 348 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 436 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance 
Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting)) (discussing the importance of 
immutability in equal protection cases). 
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burdens on certain people because of a characteristic outside of their control 
“would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”349 In addition to 
the degree of one’s control over the acquisition of a defining trait, the “rela-
tive ease or difficulty with which a trait can be changed” is also relevant to 
the immutability inquiry because it helps determine “whether someone, ra-
ther than being victimized, has voluntarily joined a persecuted group and 
thereby invited the discrimination.”350 
Transgender status is neither chosen nor changeable; it is immutable. 
According to the APA, children typically begin “expressing gendered be-
haviors and interests” between ages two and four years.351 The formation of 
one’s gender identity begins even earlier, likely within the first two years 
and perhaps even before birth.352 This, of course, well precedes a child’s 
ability to choose.353 Indeed, it strains logic to say that a person chooses to 
become part of the transgender class—membership in which quadruples 
one’s risk of suicide and exposes the person to almost certain discrimination 
in nearly every aspect of life.354 
In addition to lack of choice, over fifty years of medical research has 
confirmed that transgender status, like sexual orientation, is not “correcta-
ble.”355 In the past, some practitioners tried to “cure” transgender people 
                                                                                                                           
 349 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 350 Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; see also Watkins v. U.S. 
Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (stating that immutable character-
istics are “are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for the government to 
penalize a person for refusing to change them”). 
 351 DSM-5, supra note 13, at 455. 
 352 See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1980); see also Schroer v. Billington, 
424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that, according to some, one’s “internal sexu-
al identity . . . is produced in significant part by hormonal influences on the developing brain in 
utero”). See generally, Gerald P. Mallon, Practice with Transgendered Children, in SOCIAL SER-
VICES WITH TRANSGENDERED YOUTH 49, 52–54, 57–58 (Gerald P. Mallon ed., 1999) (stating that 
a person’s self-image as male or female is established at an early age and is highly resistant to 
change). 
 353 McConn, 489 F. Supp. at 78; see also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 
1987) (stating that “transsexualism is not voluntarily assumed”). 
 354 See Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (stating that a gay, transgender asylum applicant’s female sexual identity “must be 
fundamental, or [s]he would not have suffered this persecution and would have changed years 
ago”), abrogated by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 
(2006). 
 355 Compare Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders et al. in Support 
of Appellant A.M.B. at 6, In re A.M.B., No. CUM-09-634, (Me. Apr. 4, 2010), 2010 WL 
3972079, at *7 n.7 (stating that attempts “to ‘cure’ transgender people through aversion therapies 
and other techniques intended to alter cross-gender identification . . . were not only unsuccessful, 
but caused severe psychological damage”), and M.G. Gelder & I.M. Marks, Aversion Treatment 
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through aversion therapies and other techniques intended to alter cross-
gender identification.356 Those efforts were not only unsuccessful, but 
caused severe psychological damage.357 In “The Transsexual Phenomenon,” 
Dr. Benjamin declared attempts to cure a “useless undertaking.”358 Today, 
efforts to alter a person’s core gender identity are viewed as futile and un-
ethical.359 Accordingly, the treatment paradigm has shifted from attempting 
to “cure” the transgender person “to facilitating acceptance and manage-
ment of a gender role transition.”360 As courts have repeatedly found with 
respect to sexual orientation, gender identity is such a “central, defining 
[trait] of personhood” that it “may be altered [if at all] only at the expense 
of significant damage to the individual’s sense of self.”361 Indeed, in 2015, 
in Norsworthy v. Beard, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California stated that “the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that heightened scruti-
ny should be applied to Equal Protection claims involving discrimination 
based on sexual orientation . . . applies with at least equal force to discrimi-
nation against transgender people, whose identity is equally immutable.”362 
Importantly, transgender people who undergo transition from one gen-
der to another do not “abandon” their transgender status. Although transi-
tion aligns one’s gender identity with one’s outward expression of gender, it 
does not eliminate the incongruence between one’s gender identity and as-
signed sex at birth. For example, a post-operative male-to-female 
transgender person has a gender identity (female) that does not align with 
                                                                                                                           
in Transvestism and Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 383, 403 
(Richard Green & John Money eds., 1969) (finding that aversion therapy is unhelpful), with 2011 
DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 3 (“[A] growing scientific consensus accepts that sexual 
orientation is a characteristic that is immutable; it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual orienta-
tion to be hidden from view to avoid discrimination.”), and 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 
284, at 2 n.3 (“[S]ome of the discrimination [against lesbian and gay people] has been based on 
the incorrect belief that sexual orientation is a behavioral characteristic that can be changed . . . .”). 
 356 Gelder & Marks, supra note 355, at 403. 
 357 Mallon, supra note 352, at 55–58. 
 358 BENJAMIN, supra note 44, at 53. 
 359 Mallon, supra note 352, at 55–56. 
 360 Walter O. Bockting & Eli Coleman, A Comprehensive Approach to the Treatment of Gen-
der Dysphoria, in GENDER DYSPHORIA: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES IN CLINICAL MAN-
AGEMENT 131, 131–32 (W.O. Bockting & E. Coleman eds., 1992). 
 361 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 439 (quoting Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 
1991)); see also Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725 (Norris, J., concurring) (stating that immutability de-
scribes “traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for the govern-
ment to penalize a person for refusing to change them”). 
 362 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (emphasis added); see also Hernandez-
Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (“Sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable; they are so 
fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”). 
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her assigned sex at birth (male). A person who transitions is still a 
transgender person.363 
One might argue that transgender status is not immutable because it is 
not always obvious; some transgender people “pass” as the other gender, 
whereas others do not outwardly express their gender identity out of fear of 
prejudice or worse. This argument seems wrong in both law and fact. Under 
Supreme Court case law, visibility is not a prerequisite for finding that a 
distinguishing characteristic is immutable.364 As the Second Circuit stated 
in Windsor, these characteristics—such as alienage, for example—require 
“no ‘obvious badge.’”365 
The Second Circuit’s approach is not only consistent with case law but 
also makes good sense. As with sexual orientation, the fact that some 
transgender people may be able to keep their transgender status private is 
irrelevant.366 What matters is that when and if their transgender status “is 
manifest”—for example, when a potential employer requests prior em-
ployment records from an employee who has since undergone transition—it 
“invites discrimination.”367 Indeed, to rule otherwise by making strict scru-
tiny turn on the obviousness of a trait would subtly encourage those who 
can hide their transgender status to do so and further stigmatize those who 
cannot.368 
                                                                                                                           
 363 Although some transgender people do not personally identify as transgender, they are part 
of a group whose “gender identity . . . is different from the sex assigned to them at birth.” OPM 
Guidance, supra note 42 (“Some individuals who would fit this definition of transgender do not 
identify themselves as such, and identify simply as men and women, consistent with their gender 
identity.”). The same would be true for those with white skin who do not personally identify as 
“Caucasian.” 
 364 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 183; see also 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 3 (con-
cluding that “sexual orientation is a characteristic that is immutable” even though it “carries no 
visible badge”). 
 365 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 183. The court went on to state, 
Classifications based on alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all subject to 
heightened scrutiny . . . even though these characteristics do not declare themselves, 
and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of preference. What seems to 
matter is whether the characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is 
manifest. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 366 See id. at 183–84 (requiring “no obvious badge” for immutable characteristics). 
 367 Id. at 184. 
 368 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption 
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500 (1998) (“By withholding pro-
tection from these classifications, the judiciary is subtly encouraging groups comprised by such 
classifications to assimilate by changing or hiding their defining characteristic.”). 
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To the extent that the visibility of a distinguishing characteristic “still 
carries some weight”369 as a matter of law, transgender people surely meet 
this test as a matter of fact. Like racial minorities, most transgender people 
share “obvious . . . characteristics that define [them] as a discrete group.”370 
As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Glenn, “A person is defined as 
transgender precisely because . . . [his or her] appearance, behavior, or other 
personal characteristics differ from traditional gender norms.”371 Simply 
put, transgender status is often quite obvious. Indeed, it is this visibility that 
makes transgender status “a quintessentially stigmatic condition that . . . 
engender[s] fear and discomfort in others.”372 
d. Transgender Individuals Are a Minority and Lack Political Power 
According to the Supreme Court, a classification may warrant height-
ened scrutiny if the group so classified is “a minority or politically power-
less.”373 Because the Court has characterized this factor in disjunctive 
terms, at least one court has concluded that a showing that either the group 
is a minority or lacks political power will satisfy this factor.374 According to 
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan, this disjunctive interpretation 
acknowledges that a group that is not “a true minority” may still warrant 
heightened protection if it “nonetheless is lacking in political power.”375  
Regardless of the interpretation used, transgender people satisfy both 
parts of the analysis.376 They are clearly a minority; researchers estimate 
that transgender individuals make up approximately 0.3% of the adult popu-
lation.377 Transgender people are also politically powerless, for two reasons. 
                                                                                                                           
 369 FARRELL & CONROY, supra note 222, at 173. 
 370 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (U.S. 1987). 
 371 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. 
 372 Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People 
Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 79, 89 (Paisley Currah at al. eds., 2006); see 
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U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 374 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 439 (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602; Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 
635, 638 (1986)). 
 375 Id. 
 376 See Adkins, 2015 WL 7076956, at *4 (stating that “transgender people are a politically 
powerless minority”). 
 377 GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER? 1 (2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-
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First, they are woefully underrepresented in government and in other posi-
tions of power. No acknowledged transgender person has ever been elected 
to the U.S. Congress, served as President, or served on the federal judiciary 
or the Supreme Court. This underrepresentation pervades all levels of local, 
state, and federal government.378 As the Second Circuit noted with respect 
to lesbian and gay people in Windsor, this lack of acknowledged 
transgender people in government is “attributable either to hostility that ex-
cludes them” or to a hostility that forces them to keep their gender identity 
“private.”379 
Second, in addition to their exclusion from positions of power, 
transgender people are severely limited in their ability to attract the atten-
tion of lawmakers. The hostility transgender people experience undermines 
transgender advocacy, “suppress[ing] some degree of political activity by 
inhibiting the kind of open association that advances political agendas.”380 
This lack of political power is epitomized by the exclusion of transgender 
people from four federal civil rights laws—the Fair Housing Act, Rehabili-
tation Act, ADA, and the ADAAA—for no reason other than moral ani-
mus.381 
Transgender people’s limited ability to attract the attention of lawmak-
ers is also underscored by their lack of political power relative to lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual people. In 2011, for example, the U.S. Department of De-
fense repealed its “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy for LGB people, but not 
for transgender people.382 The armed forces can still refuse transgender ap-
plicants for admission, and the estimated 15,500 transgender service mem-
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Holmes, Obama Appoints First Transgender White House Staff Member, CNN POL. (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/transgender-white-house-obama-first-staff/ [https://perma.
cc/S8J3-M6JS] (discussing first openly transgender White House staffer); Deborah Sontag, Once a 
Pariah, Now a Judge: The Early Transgender Journey of Phyllis Frye, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/us/transgender-judge-phyllis-fryes-early-transformative-journe
y.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D4DB-Z93T] (discussing first openly transgender state judge, Phyllis 
Frye); cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion) (discussing underrepresentation of women in 
positions of power). 
 379 Windsor I, 699 F.3d at 184–85. 
 380 See id. at 185 (discussing the inability of gays and lesbians to protect themselves “from the 
discriminatory wishes of the majoritarian public”). 
 381 See supra notes 326–329 and accompanying text (discussing transgender exclusions). 
 382 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-140 (discussing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and its application 
to transgender service members). 
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bers in the U.S. military can still be discharged for being transgender.383 
Additionally, in 2007, the “last-minute jitters [of] some Democrats” over 
the Employment-Non Discrimination Act’s (“ENDA”) trans-inclusive lan-
guage prompted members of Congress to introduce a “compromise” bill 
that stripped out “gender identity,” fracturing the coalition of transgender 
and gay rights organizations in the process.384 Although the LGBT commu-
nity now stands united behind a trans-inclusive ENDA, the compromise 
bill’s support in Congress, and among some LGB advocacy groups, demon-
strates transgender people’s weak political position relative to the lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual community.385  
Indeed, transgender people, unlike gays and lesbians, had no one to 
speak for them when Congress debated the ADA in 1989. As a result, the 
ADA excluded three medical conditions associated with transgender peo-
ple—GID, transsexualism, and transvestism.386 Significantly, the ADA ex-
cludes these conditions not because they “are not impairments,” but rather 
because of the moral condemnation of two senior Senators, who believed 
GIDs and transsexualism were “sexual behavior disorders” undeserving of 
legal protection.387 In stark contrast to legislators’ understanding of homo-
sexuality and bisexuality, Senator Armstrong, the chief proponent of the 
transgender exclusions, admitted that he was “simply not learned enough or 
well enough informed” to comprehend the very medical conditions he pro-
posed excluding from the ADA.388 Senator Harkin’s statement that he was 
“not familiar” with many of Senator Armstrong’s proposed exclusions sug-
gests a similar lack of familiarity with the transgender exclusions.389 The 
reason that senators were not familiar with these medical conditions was 
because there was literally no one advocating on behalf of the transgender 
community during the ADA debate. Transgender people lacked the power to 
                                                                                                                           
 383 Emma Margolin, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Lives on for Transgender Troops, MSNBC (Oct. 
22, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/dont-ask-dont-tell-lives-transgender-troops [https://perma.
cc/2N2C-TLAP]. 
 384 Matt Foreman, A Non-Transgender-Inclusive ENDA? No Way!, BILERICO PROJECT (Sept. 27, 
2007), http://www.bilerico.com/2007/09/a_nontransgenderinclusive_enda_no_way.php [https://
perma.cc/4ED3-T6C4]. 
 385 See id. (discussing congressional support for stripping ENDA of protections for 
transgender people); see also Duffy, supra note 13, at 16-138 (discussing Human Rights Cam-
paign’s support for trans-exclusive ENDA). 
 386 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
 387 See supra notes 138–202 and accompanying text (discussing ADA’s transgender exclu-
sions). 
 388 135 CONG. REC. 19,871 (1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong), available at 1989 WL 
183216. 
 389 135 CONG. REC. 19,853 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin), available at 1989 WL 183115. 
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attract the attention of lawmakers, which resulted in the exclusion of vari-
ous conditions that uniquely impact transgender people. 
Although transgender people have achieved some impressive legal 
successes over the years,390 these advances in no way disqualify them from 
recognition as a suspect class. As the Connecticut Supreme Court stated in 
Kerrigan, “[t]he term political powerlessness . . . is clearly a misnomer.”391 
The Supreme Court does not require that people be “wholly lacking in polit-
ical influence but, rather, that the discrimination to which they have been 
subjected has been so severe and so persistent that, as with race and sex dis-
crimination, it is not likely to be remedied soon enough merely by resort to 
the majoritarian political process.”392 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized 
African-Americans as a suspect class, and women as a quasi-suspect class, 
despite important political successes for both of these groups in the years 
preceding these decisions.393 Significantly, the Court continues to apply 
heightened scrutiny to race and sex classifications “notwithstanding the 
great strides that [African-Americans and women] have made and continue 
to make in recent years in terms of political strength.”394 
                                                                                                                           
 390 These include an end to laws criminalizing cross-dressing; passage of the Hate Crimes 
Act; protection of transgender people under the Violence Against Women’s Reauthorization Act 
of 2013; coverage of gender reassignment surgery under Medicare and, in some states, Medicaid; 
the amendment of birth certificate laws to permit a change of gender designation; and, according 
to various federal agencies and several circuit courts, Title VII protection from employment dis-
crimination. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 18, 22, 25, 42); supra notes 105–
117 and accompanying text (discussing Medicare’s and Medicaid’s protection of transgender 
people); infra notes 399–435 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII’s protection of 
transgender people). 
 391 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444. 
 392 Id. at 440; see also 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 3 (“[W]hile the enactment 
of the Matthew Shepard Act and pending repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell indicate that the politi-
cal process is not closed entirely to gay and lesbian people, that is not the standard by which the 
Court has judged ‘political powerlessness.’” (emphasis added)). 
 393 Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (recognizing African-
Americans as a suspect class and subjecting classification to “most rigid scrutiny”), with U.S. 
CONST. amends. XIII–XV (providing for the end of slavery, the right to due process and equal 
protection under the law, and the right to vote), and Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 241–68 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)) (targeting racial discrimination), and Civil 
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86–92 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (2012)) 
(same), and Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634–38 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1971 (2012)) (same); compare also Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on gender), with 2011 DOJ DOMA Letter, supra note 284, at 3 (discussing 
constitutional and statutory protections for women, including passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment and protection from sex discrimination under Title VII, in existence at time the Supreme 
Court recognized women as quasi-suspect class). 
 394 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440–41. 
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Furthermore, despite some of the gains in recent years, it is unlikely 
that the democratic process will rectify the problem of discrimination 
against transgender people anytime soon.395 As courts have noted with re-
spect to gays and lesbians, there are many people in this country with sin-
cere religious beliefs against homosexuality, and this sentiment has a strong 
influence over policymakers.396 The enduring moral disapprobation aimed 
at gay and lesbian people applies equally to transgender people. This is be-
cause most opponents conflate sexual orientation with gender identity.397 
Among those opponents who understand the difference between sexual ori-
entation and gender identity, one would be hard-pressed to find a person 
who morally disapproves of lesbians and gay people but approves of 
transgender people. Simply put, those who disapprove of lesbians and gay 
people also disapprove of transgender people; they view both with equal 
disdain.398  
2. A Sex-Based Classification: Heightened Scrutiny Based on Gender 
Although the Supreme Court’s four-factor test decidedly points toward 
heightened scrutiny of classifications based on transgender status, height-
ened scrutiny is warranted for another reason. Classifications based on 
transgender status are necessarily based on sex—a type of classification the 
Supreme Court has long subjected to intermediate scrutiny.399 This subsec-
                                                                                                                           
 395 Id. at 461. 
 396 See id. at 444–45. 
[M]any people . . . sincerely believe that homosexuality is morally reprehensible. 
Indeed, homosexuality is contrary to the teachings of more than a few religions. . . . 
Feelings and beliefs predicated on such profound religious and moral principles are 
likely to be enduring, and persons and groups adhering to those views undoubtedly 
will continue to exert influence over public policy makers. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“[F]or centuries 
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation 
[of homosexuality] has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable be-
havior, and respect for the traditional family.”). 
 397 A case in point is the statement of the Moral Majority, the late Jerry Falwell’s conservative 
lobbying firm, which characterized “homosexuals” and “transvestites” as sinners, and laws that 
would protect them as “perverted.” See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the Moral 
Majority). The Traditional Values Coalition, another conservative lobbying group, likewise charac-
terizes transgender civil rights as part of “the homosexual agenda,” and “transgender[]” as a “sexual 
orientation.” See, e.g., TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, ENDA HURTS KIDS: THE IMPACT ON 
CLASSROOMS 6 (n.d.), http://www.dawnstefanowicz.org/documents/ENDAHURTSKIDS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GA89-CFYW] (characterizing transgender civil rights as part of “the homosexual 
agenda”). 
 398 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the Moral Majority). 
 399 See Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 (subjecting classification based on gender to intermediate scru-
tiny). 
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tion argues that transgender classifications are sex-based classifications for 
two reasons: transgender people’s nonconformance with sex stereotypes, 
and, more straightforwardly, transgender people’s identification with a sex 
other than their birth sex. 
a. Nonconformance with Sex Stereotypes  
First, transgender people do not conform to stereotypes associated with 
their assigned sex at birth and the sex with which they identify.400 For ex-
ample, a male-to-female transgender person who wears a dress, and a fe-
male-to-male transgender person who undergoes surgery to have his breasts 
removed, defy stereotypical assumptions about their birth sex—i.e., that 
men do not typically wear dresses, and that women do not typically remove 
their breasts. They may also defy stereotypical assumptions about the sex 
with which they identify—i.e., that women do not typically require ongoing 
electrolysis to remove facial hair, and that men do not typically undergo 
mastectomies. Therefore, transgender classifications necessarily implicate 
stereotypical assumptions about sex.401 
For over fifteen years, courts have recognized with “near-total uni-
formity” that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination based on sex 
stereotyping.402 Recognition of this “sex stereotyping” theory of 
transgender discrimination is the result of two Supreme Court decisions. In 
1989, in the seminal case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme 
Court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based not only on sex—
that is, a person being a man or a woman—but also on “sex stereotypes,” 
that is, stereotypes about how men and women should express them-
selves.403 Then, in 1998, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the 
Court held that Title VII’s prohibition extended beyond discrimination by 
men against women—the “principal evil” that originally concerned Con-
gress—to discrimination by men against men.404 The precedent set by the 
                                                                                                                           
 400 See Price Waterhouse v. Coopers, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1998) (holding that Title VII’s pro-
hibition on “sex” discrimination includes discrimination based on “sex stereotypes”), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)), as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
881 (2014). 
 401 See id. 
 402 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1317–18 & n.5. 
 403 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”). 
 404 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principle evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principle concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”). 
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combination of Price Waterhouse and Oncale has led four circuit courts and 
many district courts to find that transgender discrimination is sex discrimi-
nation based on transgender people’s nonconformance with sex stereo-
types.405 
b. Identification with Other Sex  
A second reason that transgender classifications are necessarily sex-
based classifications derives not from stereotypical assumptions about how 
men and women should express themselves, but rather from the sex with 
which men and women identify. Transgender people, by definition, have 
gender identities that do not align with their assigned sex at birth—for ex-
ample, a person born with a male anatomy who identifies as a woman.406 
Therefore, transgender classifications necessarily implicate sex: the as-
signed sex with which the transgender person does not identify, and another 
sex with which the person does identify.407 
Federal agencies have espoused this view. As the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) stated in its groundbreaking 2012 deci-
sion in Macy v. Department of Justice and recently reiterated in its 2015 
ruling in Lusardi v. Department of Army, “discrimination against a 
transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, 
discrimination ‘based on . . . sex.’”408 The Department of Justice has also 
adopted this “straightforward” view, stating that sex discrimination “en-
compasses discrimination based on gender identity, including transgender 
status” and “includes discrimination because an employee’s gender identifi-
cation is as a member of a particular sex, or because the employee is transi-
                                                                                                                           
 405 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 14-29 to 14-41 (citing cases). 
 406 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of transgender). 
 407 See infra notes 408–411 and accompanying text (citing cases). 
 408 Lusardi v. McHugh, E.E.O.C. Doc. No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756, at *7 (Apr. 1, 
2015); see also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7. 
When an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, 
the employer has engaged in disparate treatment “related to the sex of the victim.” 
This is true regardless of whether an employer discriminates against an employee 
because the individual has expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical fash-
ion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transi-
tioned or is in the process of transitioning from one gender to another, or because 
the employer simply does not like that the person is identifying as a transgender per-
son. 
Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (citation omitted). 
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tioning, or has transitioned, to another sex.”409 Accordingly, the Department 
“no longer assert[s] that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based 
on sex does not encompass gender identity per se (including transgender 
discrimination).”410 Several recent cases likewise support this straightfor-
ward theory of transgender discrimination as discrimination based on sex.411 
c. Transgender Classifications Are Sex-Based Classifications 
No matter which theory one adopts, transgender classifications are 
plainly sex-based classifications. At least two circuit courts have deter-
mined that government discrimination against transgender people is sex 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For example, in 
2004, in Smith v. City of Salem, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that a transgender firefighter, who was suspended after advising 
her employer that she was in the process of transitioning, stated a claim of 
sex discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.412 And 
in 2011, in Glenn, the Eleventh Circuit followed suit, affirming the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a transgender employee who 
was terminated from her job after informing her employer that she intended 
to transition.413 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “A person is defined as 
transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior 
transgresses gender stereotypes. The very acts that define transgender peo-
ple as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-
appropriate appearance and behavior.”414 Accordingly, “discrimination 
against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex 
                                                                                                                           
 409 Memorandum from U.S. Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys 2 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.
justice.gov/file/188671/download [https://perma.cc/38SM-DWLW] [hereinafter 2014 DOJ Trans-
gender Claims Letter]. 
 410 Id. 
 411 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912, 921–22 (6th Cir.), amended and supersed-
ed by 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “[e]ven if [transgender plaintiff] had alleged 
discrimination based only on his self-identification as a transsexual—as opposed to his specific 
appearance and behavior—this claim too is actionable pursuant to Title VII”); Schroer, 577 
F. Supp. 2d at 295 (holding that refusal to hire transgender employee after she advised her em-
ployer “that she planned to change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment surgery 
was literally sex discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (“[T]he term, ‘sex,’ as used in any scientific sense and as used in [Title VII] can 
be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the question of sexual 
identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are protected by Title VII.”), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
 412 378 F.3d at 577. 
 413 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. 
 414 Id. 
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discrimination . . . that is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”415 
District courts have similarly found transgender discrimination to be 
sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. In 2002, in Barnes v. 
City of Cincinnati, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
entered judgment after a jury trial in favor of a transgender police officer 
who was demoted after undergoing transition.416 According to the court, 
“excluding transsexuals as a class . . . [in the] interest of promoting only 
competent and capable police officers” is sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.417 In 2011, in Wilson v. Phoenix 
House, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that a transgender female inmate stated a claim for violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause on the basis of sex when the in-patient substance abuse 
treatment center in which she was confined required her to sleep in male 
facilities and use male bathrooms, denied her participation in a female sup-
port group, and discharged her to state prison when an alternative placement 
could not be found.418 And in 2015, in Norsworthy, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California held that a transgender inmate who 
was denied sex reassignment surgery stated a claim of sex discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause.419 Noting that “transgender persons meet 
the indicia of a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect classification’ identified by the 
Supreme Court,” the court concluded that “discrimination against transgender 
individuals is a form of gender-based discrimination subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.”420 
Notwithstanding the above cases, most transgender discrimination cas-
es are resolved under Title VII or related antidiscrimination statutes,421 not 
the Equal Protection Clause.422 This is because the Equal Protection Clause 
                                                                                                                           
 415 Id. at 1319. 
 416 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26207, at *30. 
 417 Id. Because the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling under Title VII, it did not 
reach the equal protection issue. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 741. 
 418 No. 10-civ-7364-DLC, 2011 WL 3273179, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011). 
 419 Norsworthy, 2015 WL 1478264, at *10. 
 420 Id.; see also Cummings v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 1:14-CV-01729, 
2015 WL 410867, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2015) (holding that transgender employee stated 
claim that she was denied equal pay and a series of promotions because of gender identity in vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 421 See, e.g., Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) (dis-
cussing Gender Motivated Violence Act); Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (discussing Title VII); 
Miles v. N. Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing Title IX). 
 422 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 15-3 (discussing the difference between Title VII and consti-
tutional claims). 
572 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:507 
does not apply in all discrimination cases—such as where the claim is 
brought by a federal employee423 or private employee,424 or where the court 
avoids reaching the constitutional question by resolving the case through 
statutory interpretation.425 Nevertheless, statutory sex discrimination cases, 
like cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause, overwhelmingly hold 
that discrimination against transgender people is sex discrimination.426 This 
is significant, because the showing a plaintiff must make to recover under 
antidiscrimination statutes mirrors the showing under the Equal Protection 
Clause and, therefore, these statutory sex discrimination cases inform the 
equal protection analysis.427 A flood of federal agencies has likewise inter-
preted transgender discrimination to be sex discrimination under Title VII 
and related antidiscrimination statutes, thus providing further support for 
like treatment of transgender discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause.428 
Despite widespread recognition by courts that sex discrimination in-
cludes transgender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and 
related antidiscrimination statutes, there are some outlier cases holding to 
the contrary. Nearly all of these are easily explained because they are old 
                                                                                                                           
 423 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy 
for claims of discrimination in federal employment.” Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 
835 (1976). 
 424 Private employers are not state actors and are therefore not subject to the Equal Protection 
Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 425 See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (“Federal statutes are to 
be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.”).  
 426 See supra notes 402–405, 408–422 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that 
transgender discrimination is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and other statutes). 
 427 See, e.g., Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316–18 (relying on Title VII case law in holding that dis-
crimination against transgender employee was sex discrimination in violation of Equal Protection 
Clause); accord Smith, 378 F.3d at 577; see also Duffy, supra note 13, at 15-5 (“Constitutional 
discrimination claims by LGBT employees often rely significantly on case law interpreting federal 
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination, including Title VII.”). 
 428 E.g., Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *5–6 (EEOC case concluding that transgender discrimi-
nation is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII); OFFICE OF FED. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DIRECTIVE 2014-02 (2014), http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/
compliance/directives/dir2014_02.html [https://perma.cc/PJ2C-KNF6] (discussing Department of 
Labor support of same); 2014 DOJ Transgender Claims Letter, supra note 409, at 1–2 (represent-
ing Department of Justice support of same); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014), http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7HM-QMVX] 
(“Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to claims of discrimination based on gender 
identity or failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity . . . .”); U.S. 
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, OSC FILE NO. MA-11-3846, REPORT OF PROHIBITED PERSONNEL 
PRACTICE 2 (2014), https://osc.gov/Resources/2014-08-28_Lusardi_PPP_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4SMU-L8L2] (concluding that discrimination against transgender employee “likely 
constitute[s] a [prohibited personnel practice] of sex discrimination”). 
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cases premised on reasoning that has been “eviscerated” by Price Water-
house and Oncale.429 Prior to 2000, courts routinely held that transgender 
discrimination was not sex discrimination because Congress had “only the 
traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind”—that is, discrimination against non-
transgender males and non-transgender females.430 Since that time, four 
circuit courts and a number of district courts throughout the circuits have 
definitively held that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination,431 
with many noting that old cases to the contrary have been “overruled by the 
logic and language” of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Price Waterhouse 
and Oncale.432 Several other circuit courts have implied as much,433 and 
absolutely no circuit court since Oncale has held that transgender discrimi-
nation is not sex discrimination.434 Accordingly, the ever-dwindling number 
of post-2000 district court cases that have declined to extend Title VII to 
transgender discrimination435 are part of an old road that is rapidly fading. 
3. No Heightened Scrutiny: Rational Basis Review 
If a challenger cannot persuade a court that the ADA’s transgender ex-
clusions warrant heightened scrutiny (because transgender people are 
                                                                                                                           
 429 See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1318 n.5. 
 430 See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 6612 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirm-
ing district court’s determination that “Title VII does not embrace transsexual discrimination”), 
overruled by Schwenk, 204 F.3d 1187; Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (holding that transsexuals “do not 
enjoy Title VII coverage”); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam) (holding that “the legislative history does not show any intention to include transsex-
ualism in Title VII”). 
 431 See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1317–18 n.5 (citing cases). 
 432 Id. (“[S]ince the decision in Price Waterhouse, federal courts have recognized with near-
total uniformity that ‘the approach in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane . . . has been eviscerated’ by 
Price Waterhouse’s holding . . . .” (quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 573)); accord Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 
1201; Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, 
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003). 
 433 See Hunter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2012) (implying that 
“transgendered or gender non-conforming individuals” are a “protected class” under Title VII, but 
affirming grant of summary judgment for employer because transgender employee failed to estab-
lish that he was “transgender or gender non-conforming”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 
1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Smith, Barnes, Rosa, and Schwenk for proposition that Title 
VII applies to transgender discrimination and “assum[ing], without deciding, that such a claim is 
available” to transgender plaintiffs, but affirming grant of summary judgment for employer based 
on employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating transgender employee). 
 434 See Duffy, supra note 13, at 14-69 to 14-77 (discussing Oncale). 
 435 See Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *2, 
*6 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) (relying on Ulane in holding that transgender discrimination is not 
sex discrimination under Title VII); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 
31098541, at *5–6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (declining to extend protection under Title VII to 
discrimination on basis of GID). 
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deemed not to be a new suspect/quasi-suspect class, and, alternatively, be-
cause transgender classifications are deemed not to be sex-based classifica-
tions), the exclusions will receive the default level of scrutiny: rational basis 
review.436 Although the rational basis test is, generally speaking, “enor-
mously deferential to the government,”437 it is unlikely that the ADA’s 
transgender exclusions can satisfy even this minimal level of scrutiny be-
cause of the moral animus underlying the exclusions—a topic to which this 
Article now turns. 
D. Constitutionally Impermissible Discrimination: A Bare Desire to Harm 
No matter what level of scrutiny is applied—“strict,” “intermediate,” 
or “rational basis”—the ADA’s transgender exclusions are unconstitutional. 
Rooted in moral animus, motivated by nothing more than a bare congres-
sional desire to harm transgender people, they are devoid of any compel-
ling, important, or legitimate governmental interest. Direct evidence of an-
imus in the ADA’s legislative history, together with evidence supporting an 
inference of animus, drawn from the exclusions’ structure and practical ef-
fect, confirm this poisoned purpose. 
As in Moreno, Cleburne, and Windsor, moral animus is explicit in the 
ADA’s legislative history.438 Senators Armstrong, Helms, and Rudman re-
peatedly invoked immorality as the justification for the transgender exclu-
sions, decrying the ADA’s coverage of “sexually deviant behavior.”439 Sena-
tor Helms’s moral diatribe against the Civil Rights Restoration Act sixteen 
months prior to the ADA’s passage, in which he advocated for private em-
ployers’ right to “mak[e] employment decisions based on moral qualifica-
tions,”440 and his exclusion of “transvestites” from the Fair Housing Act just 
one year prior to the ADA’s passage, likewise demonstrate the moral animus 
motivating the transgender exclusions.  
In addition to the direct evidence of moral animus in the ADA’s legis-
lative history, indirect evidence of moral animus abounds in the structure of 
the transgender exclusions. Three structural attributes, in particular, evince 
such animus. First, as in Romer and Windsor, the ADA disadvantages a con-
spicuously narrow group of people.441 Of the literally hundreds of medical 
conditions contained in the DSM-III-R, the ADA singles out just eleven—
                                                                                                                           
 436 See supra notes 224–266 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis review). 
 437 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 214, at 553. 
 438 See supra notes 239–262 and accompanying text (discussing cases). 
 439 See supra notes 141–187 and accompanying text (discussing Senate floor debate of ADA). 
 440 134 CONG. REC. 4235 (1988) (statement of Sen. Helms), available at 1988 WL 1084657. 
 441 See supra notes 245–249, 254–262 and accompanying text (discussing Romer and Wind-
sor II). 
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including transvestism, GID, and transsexualism—for exclusion from the 
ADA.442 Significantly, all eleven are widely perceived to involve a moral 
failing of some kind. Indeed, most of the exclusions (but not the transgender 
exclusions) pertain to conduct deemed so depraved that it is criminalized. 
Second, the haphazard way in which transvestism, GID, and transsex-
ualism are excluded—namely, the ADA’s erroneous classification of GID 
and transsexualism as “sexual behavior disorders,” the ADA’s superfluous 
exclusion of the GID subtype, “transsexualism,” and the ADA’s redundant 
exclusion of “transvestites” and “transvestism” in two different sections of 
the statute—further supports the moral animus underlying the transgender 
exclusions.443 In their frenzy to exclude any and all medical conditions as-
sociated with transgender people, Senators Armstrong and Helms complete-
ly disregarded medical accuracy and internal consistency in the ADA. 
Third, as in Romer and Windsor, the sheer breadth of the ADA’s depri-
vation of rights, and the unusual character of the deprivation, raises an in-
ference of animus.444 The ADA does not simply make it more difficult for 
people with GID, transsexualism, and transvestism to show that the law co-
vers them.445 Rather, the ADA makes it impossible by completely excluding 
from coverage people with these conditions, as well as those who formerly 
had or are falsely perceived as having these conditions.446 Furthermore, the 
transgender exclusions do not merely exclude transgender people from 
bringing claims in the employment context; rather, they exclude transgender 
people from bringing any claims under the ADA, including claims involv-
ing discrimination in public accommodations and government benefits and 
services. In addition to the breadth of the exclusions, their unusual character 
also points strongly toward animus.447 Civil rights laws generally do not 
exclude narrow groups of people. Instead they generally protect every-
one.448 The ADA’s exclusion of specific mental impairments is therefore 
completely at odds with civil rights laws. Except for the Fair Housing Act’s 
exclusion of “transvestites” in 1988, the ADA’s transgender exclusions are 
                                                                                                                           
 442 See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (excluding transvestism, GID, and transsexualism). 
 443 See supra notes 165–167, 194–199 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of ADA 
exclusions in Congress). 
 444 See supra notes 244–249, 254–262 and accompanying text (discussing inferences of ani-
mus in Romer and Windsor). 
 445 For example, the ADA does not increase transgender people’s burden of proving that they 
are substantially limited in a major life activity, qualified, or not a direct threat. 
 446 See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
 447 See supra notes 244–249, 254–262 and accompanying text (discussing inferences of ani-
mus in Romer and Windsor II). 
 448 See Barry, supra note 159, at 17 (discussing Senator Armstrong’s mischaracterization of 
civil rights laws and stating that they generally “protect all races, including white people; all reli-
gions, including atheists; and all sexes, including men”). 
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so “exceptional,” “unprecedented,” “unusual,” and “rare,” that they appear 
to have been “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened 
by the law.”449 
An inference of animus is also suggested by the practical effect of the 
transgender exclusions, which amounts to a one-two punch for transgender 
people.450 First, the exclusions bar transgender people from securing the 
antidiscrimination protections provided by the ADA, including protection 
from discrimination in the workplace, in the receipt of government benefits 
and services, and in access to public accommodations.451 Second, the 
ADA’s exclusion of conditions associated with transgender people, together 
with a small handful of other conditions deemed immoral, also sends a 
strong symbolic message: transgender people have no civil rights worthy of 
respect.452 By maintaining the transgender exclusions, the ADA therefore 
“imposes a stigma”453 on transgender people by marking them as undeserv-
ing of civil rights protection, which is starkly at odds with the goals of the 
ADA.454 
Under heightened scrutiny, the equal protection analysis would end 
here. The transgender exclusions fail because moral animus is plainly insuf-
ficient to constitute a compelling or necessary governmental interest.455 
Nevertheless, the ADA’s transgender exclusions still fail even under rational 
basis review. Given the overwhelming evidence of moral animus underlying 
the transgender exclusions, the demanding variety of rational basis review 
would apply.456 Under demanding rational basis, animus is an evidentiary 
                                                                                                                           
 449 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33, 635. 
 450 See supra notes 244–266 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court’s inference of 
animus based on practical effect of challenged law in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor II, and Oberge-
fell). 
 451 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). 
 452 The same negative associations attached to people living with HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 
1990s. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“The particular associations 
AIDS shares with sexual fault, drug use, social disorder, and with racial minorities, the poor, and 
other historically disenfranchised groups accentuates the tendency to visit condemnation upon its 
victims.”). 
 453 United States v. Windsor (Windsor II), 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693; see also Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2590, 2602 (citing Windsor II and discussing the “stigma” imposed on same-sex couples 
and their children by laws prohibiting same-sex marriage); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (discussing 
the “stigma” imposed by same-sex sodomy statutes). 
 454 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2012); Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., 480 U.S. at 284; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (stating that “society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities”). 
 455 See Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 900 (“Because laws based on animus cannot survive ra-
tional basis review, by definition neither can they survive intermediate or strict scrutiny.”). 
 456 See supra notes 224–266 and accompanying text (discussing the more demanding form of 
rational basis review). 
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trump card that discredits other “legitimate” explanations as mere pretext.457 
As the Court stated in Romer, a classification grounded in moral animus 
inflicts “immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any 
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.”458 And as the Court 
stated in Windsor, “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect 
to disparage and to injure.”459  
Accordingly, Senator Armstrong’s suggestion that the transgender ex-
clusions were motivated, in part, by a desire to shield private employers 
from a flood of “egregious” lawsuits plainly fails to overcome the powerful 
evidence of moral animus underlying the exclusion.460 His suggestion is 
also completely unfounded; there is nothing inherently “egregious” or oth-
erwise frivolous about transgender people claiming protection under disa-
bility antidiscrimination law, nor is there anything to suggest that permitting 
such claims would lead to a flood of lawsuits—especially given the small 
number of people with GID, transsexualism, and transvestism.461 
IV. BLATT’S IMPLICATIONS 
Ms. Blatt’s equal protection challenge has broad legal and theoretical 
implications. From a legal standpoint, if Ms. Blatt’s challenge prevails, it 
will provide antidiscrimination protection to many transgender people under 
the ADA. Because the ADA is a “comprehensive” civil rights law,462 it will 
extend protection beyond the workplace to many other areas, such as public 
accommodations and government benefits and services, in which 
transgender people experience discrimination. And, unlike other civil rights 
laws, the ADA also requires reasonable accommodations,463 which, for 
transgender workers, might include modifying policies governing restroom 
usage and dressing and grooming standards, as well as modifying a person’s 
work schedule or granting a person leave to seek counseling, hormone ther-
apy, electrolysis, reassignment surgery, or other treatment.464 
                                                                                                                           
 457 See supra notes 224–266 and accompanying text (same). 
 458 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added). 
 459 Windsor II, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added). 
 460 See supra notes 169–187 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Armstrong’s “flood-
of-egregious-litigation” argument). 
 461 See DSM-5, supra note 13, at 454 (noting that only between 0.005% to 0.014% of adult 
males and 0.002% to 0.003% of adult females are diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria). 
 462 42 U.S.C § 12101(b) (2012). 
 463 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 464 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B) (2012). See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE 
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Furthermore, Ms. Blatt’s challenge, if successful, will almost certainly 
extend disability rights protection to transgender people under the Rehabili-
tation Act, which contains an identical exclusion, and, possibly, to the Fair 
Housing Act, which contains a similar exclusion.465 It will also be strong 
persuasive precedent for numerous state disability antidiscrimination laws 
with transgender exclusions that mirror the ADA.466  
More broadly, by securing legal recognition under the ADA and other 
disability antidiscrimination laws, Ms. Blatt’s argument will achieve some-
thing else: it will eliminate a source of blatant, legally-sanctioned prejudice 
that has served for twenty-five years to stigmatize transgender people as 
unworthy of disability rights. In so doing, it will make good on the ADA’s 
promise to break down “the prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others” and 
the “inferior status” that people with disabilities occupy in our society.467 
Indeed, in a memorandum to then-Attorney General Eric Holder supporting 
Ms. Blatt’s equal protection challenge, the representatives of five national 
transgender rights organizations confirmed that the transgender community 
“stands united” against the ADA’s “animus-based” transgender exclusions, 
which serve to exacerbate the stigma against transgender people.468 
Additionally, a successful equal protection challenge will reach far be-
yond disability rights, setting the stage for challenges to all laws that single 
out transgender people for disparate treatment. This includes current De-
partment of Defense policies that prohibit military service on the basis of 
“transsexualism” and “transvestism,”469 sundry federal regulations import-
                                                                                                                           
docs/accommodation.html#leave [https://perma.cc/Y4AM-6CWC] (discussing types of reasonable 
accommodations under the ADA). 
 465 See supra notes 131–137, 202 and accompanying text (discussing the Fair Housing and 
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hibiting transgender people from serving in the military. Matthew Rosenberg, Pentagon Moves to 
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ing the ADA’s transgender exclusions,470 and state laws that inappropriately 
deny medical coverage for transgender healthcare.471 
A successful challenge to the ADA’s transgender exclusions would 
therefore provide an important new break for transgender equality and for 
equality law more generally. It would be a crucial first step toward accom-
plishing for transgender people what Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Ober-
gefell did for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people: constitutional recognition of 
their equality. Moreover, a successful Blatt challenge—invoking either 
heightened scrutiny or demanding rational basis—would reaffirm equality 
law’s expansive embrace of subordinated groups and its prohibition of mor-
al animus as a justification for exclusion, and would temper the “pluralism 
anxiety” of courts resistant to the extension of equal protection doctrine.472 
On the heels of marriage equality, a successful ADA challenge would also 
underscore the continued salience of group-based identity politics for secur-
ing constitutional rights.473 
At a theoretical level, Ms. Blatt’s case informs the broader debate over 
what it means to be “transgender” and what it means to be “disabled.” As 
for the former, her argument brings coherence to the impairment-identity 
debate that exists in transgender rights discourse.474 Some well-intentioned 
laypeople that support or are even part of the transgender community ques-
tion the authenticity of Gender Dysphoria (and GID before it). For them, the 
                                                                                                                           
Allow Transgender People to Serve Openly in the Military, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/us/pentagon-plan-would-let-transgender-people-serve-openly.html
?smid=nytcore-iphone-share&smprod=nytcore-iphone [https://perma.cc/US9W-Q3JC]. 
 470 For example, the Department of Labor has incorporated the ADA’s transgender exclusions 
into regulations implementing the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, 29 C.F.R. § 34.2 (1993), 
and regulations implementing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 C.F.R. § 37.4 (1999). 
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 471 See Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp. 2d 235, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that denial 
of Medicaid reimbursement for gender reassignment surgery was rationally related to conservation 
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CJS, 2009 WL 2163105, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009) (“[T]he mere passage of time is not a 
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 472 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (dis-
cussing U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on pluralism anxiety as justification for limiting expansion 
of equality doctrine). 
 473 See id. at 755 (“Under the Supreme Court’s own account, pluralism anxiety has pressed 
the Court away from traditional group-based identity politics in its equal protection and free exer-
cise jurisprudence.”). 
 474 See, e.g., Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274, 274–75 
(Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the debate over whether or not to keep GID as a 
diagnosis); see also Barry, supra note 159, at 44–45 (discussing objections to GID diagnosis). 
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diagnosis pathologizes gender nonconformity and stigmatizes transgender 
people as “abnormal.”475 According to Ms. Blatt and her amici, however, 
the new diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria, by its terms, does quite the oppo-
site. By deleting all reference to “disorder,” by noting that the condition is 
physiologically rooted and treatable through medical interventions such as 
hormones and surgery, and by focusing on distress—not identity—as the 
problem in need of treatment, Gender Dysphoria in fact depathologizes 
gender nonconformity.476 It sharply disassociates gender nonconformity, 
which is perfectly healthy, from a serious medical condition that, if left un-
treated, can lead to death.477 
By claiming disability rights protection based on Gender Dysphoria, 
Ms. Blatt does not argue that gender nonconformity is a medical condition 
and that all transgender people necessarily have Gender Dysphoria. Many 
transgender people, she argues, do not have Gender Dysphoria; they experi-
ence no distress as a result of their gender nonconformity.478 For them, sex 
discrimination laws like Title VII and state and proposed federal gender-
identity discrimination laws are the most logical route to legal protection. 
However, for those transgender people who experience clinically significant 
distress as a result of their gender nonconformity, who have successfully 
undergone medical treatment to alleviate such distress, or who are perceived 
by others as having such distress, disability rights law should protect them. 
As for what it means to be “disabled,” Ms. Blatt’s argument under-
scores the importance of the “social model” of disability underlying disabil-
ity rights law. “Disability,” under the social model’s rendering, results not 
from the way in which our medical conditions disadvantage us, but rather 
from the ways in which our society disadvantages us through its negative 
reactions to our medical conditions.479 Disability rights laws like the ADA 
adopt this understanding, protecting all who are treated adversely based on 
a past, present, or perceived medical impairment. Indeed, in 2008, Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 475 See Butler, supra note 474, at 275. 
 476 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing the change from “disorder” to 
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amended the ADA to clarify its intent that the definition of disability should 
not be limited to those whose impairments prevent or severely restrict them 
from performing life activities; rather, the law should “be construed in favor 
of broad coverage of individuals.”480 By claiming protection under the 
ADA, Ms. Blatt therefore does not argue that Gender Dysphoria, in and of 
itself, prevents her from working.481 Instead she argues, consistent with the 
social model, that her employer’s negative reactions to Gender Dysphoria—
namely, fear, discomfort, lack of understanding, and animus—have disabled 
her, thereby triggering the protection of disability rights law. 
CONCLUSION 
Transgender issues have exploded into the public consciousness in re-
cent years, with the stories of well-known figures like Caitlyn Jenner and 
Chaz Bono bringing light to the struggles of transgender people in our 
midst.482 With this awareness has come long overdue recognition of 
transgender people’s legal rights in healthcare, in the workplace, and be-
yond. But key barriers remain. Unlike their gay, lesbian, and bisexual coun-
terparts, whose constitutional rights were finally vindicated in Obergefell, 
the constitutional rights of transgender people remain uncertain. With mar-
riage equality achieved, the next civil rights frontier belongs to transgender 
people. It begins with Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., a case challenging the 
ADA’s exclusion of medical conditions associated with transgender people 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Transgender classifications like these 
should receive heightened scrutiny because transgender people are a “sus-
pect” or “quasi-suspect” class, or because such classifications are necessari-
ly based on sex. But even under rational basis review, these classifications 
should fail because they are rooted solely in moral animus. 
A successful equal protection challenge to the ADA will extend disa-
bility rights protection to transgender people under a host of federal and 
state laws, and will inform the broader theoretical debate over the relation-
ship between identity and impairment, and diagnosis and discrimination. A 
successful challenge will also reach far beyond disability rights to all laws 
that single out transgender people for disparate treatment, paving the way 
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toward “equal dignity in the eyes of the law” for transgender people.483 In 
the words of Justice Kennedy, “The Constitution grants them that right.”484
                                                                                                                           
 483 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (recognizing the right to marry 
someone of the same sex under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 484 Id. 

  
 
 
